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Infrastructure systems are essential to the functioning of contemporary societies 
and economies.  A major disruption to the built environment can lead to severe public 
safety issues and economic losses. Within the past few decades, modern control and 
information technologies have been rapidly developed in an attempt to improve the 
reliability of individual utility systems by exchanging technologies across them. One of 
the major ramifications is the emergence of interdependencies among these critical 
infrastructure systems, especially when facing major disruptions. Failure of an individual 
system becomes more likely to affect the functionality of other interconnected 
infrastructure systems. In order to mitigate such consequences, the mechanics of 
interdependencies and failure propagation among the systems must be understood.  
This research focuses on the development of a framework for probabilistically 
quantifying interdependent responses of two essential infrastructure systems – 
telecommunication and electric power systems – subjected to seismic hazards, which are 
one of the most powerful and geographically extensive threats. The study explores the 
effects of seismic hazards beyond the obvious seismic-induced physical damage to utility 
system facilities. In particular, the seismic evaluation of telecommunication systems 
considers the degradation of system performance due to physical damage and the 
abnormally high usage demands in telecommunication systems expected after 
catastrophic earthquakes. Specifically, a newly developed seismic-induced congestion 
model is proposed, and the probabilistic formulations of the critical interdependencies 
across telecommunication and power systems are presented in a probabilistic framework. 
 xiv 
The study illustrates the procedure for fragility analysis of interdependent systems and 
presents a practical application through a test bed implementation in Shelby County, TN. 
From this study, telecommunication systems are found to be very vulnerable to 
seismic-induced congestion. The electric power interdependencies amplify the 
degradation in telecommunication systems up to 50% in their vulnerability while electric 
power operations are heavily dependent upon telecommunication infrastructures and the 
fragility median of electric power system observability can decrease by 30%. The study 
also indicates up to 100% overestimation of the independent fragility analysis and the 
results reveal the relationship between system topology and the sensitivity of system 
performance to the intensity of interdependencies. The proposed methodology is 
expected to be a valuable tool for decision making in evaluating seismic mitigation 
strategies and also to provide the foundation for future studies on interdependent 
responses of other critical infrastructures. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the modern world, public safety, economic prosperity, and social activities 
heavily depend on the functionality of complex infrastructure systems. Electric power 
grids, water networks, oil and gas distribution systems, transportation infrastructure, and 
telecommunication systems are examples of these critical lifeline systems.  
Over the last few decades, these infrastructure systems have greatly improved 
their efficiency to adequately meet growing demands. One result of this improved control 
and efficiency is that interdependencies among infrastructure systems have increased 
dramatically.  The technology of each infrastructure system is built upon the 
advancements of the others.  As an example, the banking and financial systems have 
benefited from the advancements in information and communications technologies. 
Instant trading in the stock market, world-wide automatic teller machines (ATMs), and 
instant approval of credit card transactions are all made possible by data transmission 
over telecommunication networks. Also, electrical systems have benefited from 
advancements in natural gas infrastructures: more gas turbines are used in electric power 
generation because of the improvement in reliability and efficiency of natural gas 
production and transmission (Amin 2000).  
Although these systems are engineered to supply continuous services, rare 
incidents such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks can cause major disruptions. The 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 2004 Great Sumatra earthquake and Indian 
Ocean tsunamis, 2010 Chile earthquake, 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunamis, and 
Hurricanes Katrina and Ike are but the most recent reminders that efforts to mitigate 
devastating consequences of lifeline disruptions require the understanding of not only the 
individual infrastructure system behavior, but also understanding of their interactions.  
 2 
Interdependency is defined as a bidirectional relationship between infrastructure 
systems. There are four primary classes of interdependencies: physical, cyber, 
geographic, and logical. Physical interdependency describes the material input-output 
connections among infrastructure components.  Geographical interdependency exists 
because of the co-location of infrastructure system components. An infrastructure is said 
to have cyber interdependency when its state relies on information transmitted through 
the information infrastructure. Other linkages that are not physical, cyber, or geographic 
connections are classified as logical interdependencies (Rinaldi et al. 2001, Rinaldi 
2004). Among the four classes, cyber interdependency is considered the most important 
by the United States government. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection recognizes that the information system is a key system 
that supports other critical infrastructures. Protecting telecommunication and information 
systems from disruptions is the focus of the directive because such disruption can lead to 
other critical infrastructure failures or large scale inefficient operation (Heller 2001). 
Currently, telecommunication systems represent one of the fastest growing 
infrastructure sectors. As a result, most infrastructures have some form of cyber-
interdependency. For example, the electric power system expands services and maintains 
stability using Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems to 
continuously transmit voltage, current, and power information from facilities to power 
control centers using telecommunication networks. This information is used for real-time 
calculation of supply, demand, and status of the overall system. The electric power 
control center uses this information to send appropriate instructions to match supply and 
demand and maintain overall system stability (Meliopoulos 2005). This trend also 
enhances the development of smart electric power grids that are capable of self-healing. 
Other infrastructures rely on telecommunication and information systems to 
function or recover functionality. Another example of a cyber-interdependent 
infrastructure is the transportation system. Traffic control systems collect information 
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from automated sensors installed at intersections and highways, and transmit the 
information to traffic control centers. Traffic signals are then remotely controlled by the 
control center through cyber-technology, responding to any incidents on roadways 
efficiently.  
Earthquakes have been recognized as serious threat to infrastructures around the 
world. Past earthquakes have demonstrated their destructive effects on infrastructure 
system functionality and post-disaster recovery. At a 6.7 magnitude, the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake caused widespread disruptions to transportation, water, power and 
communication systems. Los Angeles highways, which normally carry high traffic 
volume, were closed for several months due to extensive damage. Several communities 
were without water for up to two weeks. The Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power (DWP) and Southern California Edison Company (SCE) suffered a direct loss 
totaling $183 million. Approximately 950,000 customers were without electricity after 
the initial shock. The call volume in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
jumped to almost four times the normal volume and caused significant congestion, 
thereby increasing wait time for 911. Most central telephone office outages were caused 
by power outages (Schiff 1995). One year later, the Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, also 
known as the Kobe earthquake, measuring 6.9 in magnitude, devastated Japanese 
infrastructure systems. The damages to highways alone were estimated at $5 billion and 
resulted in delayed rescue and recovery operations. A massive effort was required to 
restore telephone communication service, for which total damage was estimated at $3 
billion. Water outages in Kobe lasted up to 60 days. Direct economic losses were 
estimated at $200 billion (Schiff 1999). However, indirect losses due to industrial and 
economic disruptions were even higher.  
Understanding how infrastructure systems react to seismic hazards will help 
improve their joint performance during and after disasters. Previous studies focused on 
individual systems, with very few considering interdependencies. Not considering such 
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interdependencies underestimates the magnitude of lifeline infrastructure disruption. 
Recently, some studies have considered physical and geographic interdependencies 
(Dueñas-Osorio 2005, Kim et al. 2007). However, not many studies include cyber 
interdependencies. As the overall built infrastructures becomes more and more dependent 
on information systems, understanding the interdependencies between them during 
seismic hazards will help to better prepare for reliable operation and effective mitigation 
should such events occur. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 The overall goal of this research is to develop methodologies for evaluating the 
interdependent response of telecommunication and electric power systems. The methods 
developed are used to estimate the performance and interdependency of both systems 
under seismic conditions. The research results provide guidelines for the improvement 
and design of existing and future systems. Moreover, they are expected to be useful in 
developing efficient post-earthquake recovery plans. In order to achieve this goal, four 
intermediate objectives are established. 
 First, this thesis develops the necessary methodologies and models for evaluating 
the seismic performance of telecommunication systems. Voice and data 
telecommunication systems selected for interdependent analysis in this study includes the 
public switched telephone network (PSTN), cellular telephone networks, and the SCADA 
system. Two common impacts of seismic hazards on infrastructure systems are 
considered. The first is the physical damage to system components that significantly 
affect infrastructure performance. The second impact is the high post-disaster 
communication demand. High call volume on the PSTN is commonly expected after an 
earthquake, and is a cause of network congestion, leading to delays in communication 
and overall system failure. 
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 Second, this research defines, simulates and validates the interdependencies 
between telecommunication and electric power systems. The two interdependencies 
considered in this study are: (1) the dependency of telecommunication network operation 
on electric power and (2) the dependency of electric power system operation upon data 
communication. 
 Third, the study provides a comprehensive framework for interdependent 
performance assessment of infrastructure systems subjected to seismic hazards. The 
contributions of various network components to the seismic system-level performance are 
investigated. The seismic performance of the interdependent systems is probabilistically 
estimated from network topologies and performance matrices of network components.  
 Finally, this thesis demonstrates real-world applications of the proposed 
methodologies on seismic mitigation. Examples of the economic impacts and losses 
assessment after earthquake events, along with the planning of pre-earthquake mitigation 
actions and post-earthquake recovery actions are given. Moreover, the application on 
seismic performance evaluation of existing infrastructures is illustrated. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
 This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews existing 
research in the fields of lifeline earthquake engineering on telecommunication systems, 
electric power grids and interdependent infrastructures. Chapter 3 presents the effects of 
seismic hazard on telecommunication and electric power systems. Chapter 4 presents the 
fundamental topological, flow, and reliability characteristics of each system and 
introduces mathematical network models used for seismic performance evaluation. In 
Chapter 5, the interdependencies between telecommunication and electric power system 
are defined. Critical assumptions are also presented. The results from the proposed 
interdependent system analyses are presented in Chapter 6. In particular, seismic 
response of the test bed infrastructure systems to seismic hazards are discussed and the 
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effects of interdependencies are demonstrated.  This chapter also demonstrates the 
application of the proposed methodologies to minimizing seismic disruptions. Examples 
of seismic evaluation of existing systems are provided to illustrate an application to 
optimal mitigation actions and efficient recoveries strategies. Finally, Chapter 7 
summarizes the research findings, concludes the study, and suggests future research 
directions in the area.  
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CHAPTER 2  
TELECOMMUNICATION AND ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS IN 
LIFELINE EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 
 
 This chapter reviews the relevant literature on electric power and 
telecommunication systems, and provides a critical appraisal of previous studies 
regarding their seismic performance along with a discussion on emerging infrastructure 
interdependencies. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a review 
of research in the lifeline earthquake engineering field related to individual systems. The 
review starts with the studies supported by national earthquake institutes and relevant 
organizations, and then continues with the contribution of individual researchers. In the 
second part, research in interdependent infrastructures is reviewed. Finally, a critical 
appraisal of the current state of the research and opportunities to further the knowledge 
base of the field are provided. 
2.1 Review of Previous Work 
 The 1971 San Fernando, California, Earthquake was the first earthquake to cause 
significant damage to bridges, power, telecommunication, water, and gas systems in the 
continental U.S. since the 1933 Long Beach earthquake (Schiff 2004).  Because these 
systems are vital to modern societies, the term ―lifelines‖ was first used to refer to civil 
infrastructure systems shortly after the San Fernando earthquake to emphasize their 
importance. 
 Following the San Fernando earthquake, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) formed the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) to 
address the earthquake engineering aspects of lifeline systems (Schiff 2004). TCLEE is 
comprised of several technical committees focusing on different sections of lifelines. The 
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efforts to improve seismic performance of electric power and telecommunication lifeline 
systems are made through the Electrical Power and Communications Lifelines 
Committee. A number of design and installation guidelines for electric and 
communication equipment are provided based upon experiments and experience from 
past earthquakes. However, the performance evaluation of infrastructures at the system 
level is hardly addressed. 
 The Applied Technology Council (ATC) is another organization that conducts 
research in lifeline earthquake engineering. In 1982 the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) awarded ATC a contract to develop earthquake damage evaluation data 
for facilities in California, known as the ATC-13 project. Damage, loss, and restoration 
times were evaluated for a number of California infrastructures on the basis of expert 
opinions (Applied Technology Council 1985). In 1988, FEMA awarded ATC another 
contract known as the ATC-25 project to develop seismic vulnerability functions and 
study the impacts of lifeline disruption in the conterminous United States. Lifelines 
considered in the ATC-25 project included electric power, water, transportation, gas and 
liquid fuel supply systems, and emergency service facilities such as hospital, fire, and 
police stations. Other facilities, such as telecommunication, nuclear and fossil-fuel power 
plants, and other water, electric, and transportation facilities were excluded from 
consideration due to unavailability of inventory data or the need for more in-depth 
studies.  
 The goal of the ATC-25 project was to estimate direct damage and associated loss 
for nationwide scenario earthquakes. Seismic vulnerability functions for each lifeline 
component were developed by regression analysis of data from the ATC-13 project. The 
functions include direct damage and residual capacity functions. The direct damage 
function is a relationship between repair costs, as a fraction of facility value, and 
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI), a measure of seismic intensity effects at a particular 
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site. The residual capacity function is a fraction of the initial capacity available after an 
earthquake as a function of elapsed time after the initial shock for given MMI levels.  
 For a scenario earthquake, the MMI for each facility within the affected areas was 
determined. The direct damage and residual capacity of each component were then 
calculated using vulnerability functions. Residual capacities of individual lifeline systems 
were then evaluated by integrating the component residual capacities. For site-specific 
lifeline systems, such as airports, police stations, and medical care centers, system 
residual capacity is the average of facility residual capacities. For networked lifeline 
systems, such as oil pipelines and highways, the minimum-cut-maximum-flow theorem 
was used to determine system residual capacity as the ratio of maximum flow of a 
damaged system to its corresponding undamaged system. Although electric power 
systems are obviously networked lifeline systems, power grids were considered site-
specific lifelines for residual capacity analysis in the ATC study. Only residual capacities 
of transmission substations were considered. Transmission lines and network flow were 
ignored for electric power systems (Applied Technology Council 1991). These 
assumptions result in underestimated direct and indirect economic losses from power grid 
unavailability. For example, undamaged substations cannot contribute to system 
performance because they are disconnected by damaged transmission lines. Moreover, 
without considering connections among components, the effects of electric power system 
flow are missing. 
 The National Science Foundation (NSF) established three national earthquake 
engineering research centers to conduct research on various topics in earthquake 
engineering including lifeline engineering. The three centers  are the Multidisciplinary 
Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER), the Pacific Earthquake 
Engineering Research Center (PEER), and the Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAEC) 
(National Science Foundation 1997). Originally NSF established the National Center for 
Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in 1986; NCEER later became MCEER in 
 10 
1998 at which time PEER and MAEC were also established.  Research at MCEER has 
included a number of studies on lifeline engineering. Much of this is on water 
distribution, oil and gas transmission and electric power transmission systems (Chang et 
al. 1995, Shinozuka et al. 1998). Seismic performance of equipment and facilities has 
been studied intensively while limited studies have considered system-level performance, 
especially for electric power systems. One of the studies attempted to estimate the 
economic impact of electric power, gas, and water system disruption due to earthquakes 
in Shelby County, Tennessee. The study used modified results from the ATC-25 project 
to evaluate system restoration times. Functionalities of electric power transmission 
substations were used to represent the availability of electric power in a given area under 
the assumption that transmission substations are the most time-consuming to repair 
compared to other components, such as transmission lines and distribution substations 
(Chang et al. 1995). For economic impact estimation, this approach is reasonable; 
however, it gives no insight into the effects of system topology on response, and 
interactions among system components. Moreover, probabilistic estimation and 
interpretation of the results are still ambiguous. 
 For over a decade, PEER has made a number of contributions to the earthquake 
engineering community. PEER research is focused on the concept of performance-based 
engineering. For lifeline engineering research activities, the PEER lifelines program was 
also formed. The goal of the program is to improve seismic safety and reliability of 
lifeline systems. Most PEER lifeline research projects focus on electric power systems 
and transportation networks, because PEER research is mainly funded by the California 
Department of Transportation, California Energy Commission, and Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company. In order to develop unified lifeline risk and reliability models for 
lifeline research projects, modeling platforms are also studied. Evaluation of system 
performance is included in one of the six steps of the modeling platforms (initialization, 
inventory of facilities, evaluate component performance, evaluate system performance, 
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and summary of results). Use of simple performance algorithms or the expert opinion of 
system operators is recommended as a minimum for the electric power system in this 
step. The algorithms evaluate connectivity and load-flow of the system (Werner et al. 
2002). Although the study establishes the platform for seismic risk and reliability analysis 
of a lifeline network, further research and results on system evaluation are not available.  
 The MAE Center has studied a variety of topics including the characteristics of 
intraplate earthquakes. Earthquakes in mid-America are less frequent than those along the 
Pacific coast of the United States but their consequences tend to be higher. As a result, 
MAEC research is focused on topics related to consequence-based risk management 
(CRM). MAEC’s core research is separated into four thrust areas: concepts of 
consequence-based risk management, core engineering technologies (also called 
―engineering engines‖), social and economic science, and applied information 
technology. Studies of lifelines are included in the core engineering technologies thrust 
area which also includes transportation systems and interdependent lifeline networks.  
 In addition to these three earthquake engineering centers, the Institute of Electric 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is another organization interested in the reduction of 
earthquake impacts on electric power systems. Because an earthquake is a potential cause 
of substation loss and cascading failure of power grids, the IEEE focuses on improving 
seismic performance of substations. It provides recommendations for the seismic design 
of electric substations focusing on substation buildings and equipment. Installation, 
design considerations, qualification methods, and seismic performance criteria of 
equipment are included (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2005). 
However, interactions among substations and power grid system performance after 
earthquakes are not considered. Although telecommunication systems are included in the 
IEEE scope of studies, earthquake impacts to telecommunication networks have not been 
addressed by the organization. 
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 In order to ensure reliable electric power systems after earthquakes, overall 
system performance must be properly considered. To date, studies of the seismic 
performance of electric power systems in lifeline earthquake engineering have focused on 
equipment and facilities performance, not overall system-level performance. While 
system performance of networked systems is highly dependent upon system connectivity 
and topology, not many studies of system performance under seismic conditions have 
been conducted. A lack of insight into seismic response of overall systems can prevent 
improvement of power grid reliability. Since the power grid is spatially distributed, 
detailed analysis of network flow is needed to reveal responses of critical areas and key 
components whose individual performance contribute significantly to overall system 
performance. This information on network flows facilitates optimal improvement of 
system functionality when resources are limited. Until recently, there has been a lack of 
understanding of electric power system performance under seismic conditions. 
 The seismic performance of electric power systems is of more concern to the 
earthquake community than that of telecommunication systems. This is because past 
California earthquakes resulted in little damage to telecommunication networks 
compared to power grids. However, this may not be true for other parts of the U.S. where 
there are no seismic provisions in place (Schiff 2004). Moreover, new technologies for 
telecommunication systems, such as modern digital telephone switches and optical fiber 
transmission lines, tend to increase equipment capacity. These modern 
telecommunication systems are widely used by utility companies loosely to catch up with 
the increase in demands without considering the effects on system reliability. This raises 
the question of flow concentration issues. The loss of a few high capacity components 
can significantly degrade system performance when the system is under stress (Wong 
1998).  
 Besides seismic-induced physical damage, congestion in telecommunication 
networks is another reason why seismic performance of telecommunication systems 
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should not be neglected. Past earthquakes such as the Northridge and Kobe earthquakes 
showed that the communication demand increases significantly after earthquake events. 
Most calls are initiated outside of the affected area because of safety concerns of disaster 
victims (Tang 1998). The most recent 2011 Japan earthquake also indicates increase of 8 
to 10 times beyond normal demand (ASCE 2011). This can cause substantial 
communication delays within the affected areas.  
 Since communication is critical to the efficiency of emergency response and 
recovery actions, its reliability needs to be assured. However, there is still a lack of 
understanding of the response of telecommunication systems to earthquakes, and this can 
lead to poor seismic performance of the system and delay of overall recovery activities. 
2.2 Interdependent Infrastructures 
 In the past, critical infrastructures were physically and logically developed as 
separate systems with minimal interconnection. However, advances in information 
technology and the necessity of more efficient operation of these systems has increased 
their interdependencies. Although efficiencies maybe increased by integration of systems, 
coupled infrastructures are also vulnerable to disruptions and failure propagation within 
and across systems. In order to ensure general public health and safety, a better 
understanding of infrastructure interdependencies is required to reduce their 
vulnerabilities (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1998). 
Although seismic performance of lifelines has been studied by the earthquake 
engineering community since the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, the interdependency or 
interaction of lifeline systems was not considered until the mid-1980s (Yao et al. 2004). 
TCLEE formed the Lifeline System Interdependencies Committee (LSIC) to address 
interdependency issues in lifeline systems only shortly after the 2010 Chile earthquake.  
Some significant studies are summarized in this section. 
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 Interdependent responses of infrastructures are usually observed and recorded 
from post-earthquake investigations. There are many impacts of system 
interdependencies that cause significant disruptions to lifelines.  These interdependencies 
are summarized and classified into four categories as follows (Nojima and Kameda 
1991):  
 Category A: Functional disaster propagation - Interactions are listed in this 
category when failures of lifeline components affect functionality of other system 
components. For example, failure of an electric power substation reduces the 
serviceability of water pumping stations and telephone switches in the service area.  
 Category B: Physical disaster propagation - This category describes interactions 
that cause physical damage to other systems. For instance, an explosion of underground 
gas transmission lines causes breaks in adjacent telephone lines and water pipes that run 
in parallel. 
 Category C: Hindrance in the recovery stage - This category represents 
interactions that cause delays and/or difficulties to recovery activities of other lifelines. 
For example, damage to transportation networks may result in the delay of electric power 
substation repair, as service teams are prevented from reaching damaged substations in a 
timely manner. Damage to telecommunications systems may also delay notification of 
lifeline managers informing them of damage to other systems.   
 Category D: Influences on alternative systems - Interactions in this category are 
those whose failures affect other lifelines that can be used as alternatives for the same 
purpose. For example, disruptions to telephone systems increase the use of two-way radio 
communication network among emergency response agencies. 
 In the study by Nojima and Kameda (1991), Category A was considered a major 
issue. Cross Impact Analysis, a systematic method to evaluate the probability of 
occurrence of various events in an interaction relationship, was used to quantify 
functional disaster propagation. To demonstrate this method, two lifeline systems, 
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electric power and water networks were considered. Commonly, the event that a water 
pumping station is not functional (event   ) is caused by: (1) water network failure 
resulting in no water supplied to the station (event   ), and (2) electric power system 
failure to supply power to the station (event   ). However, water pumping stations are 
usually equipped with backup generators. Therefore event    does not necessarily lead to 
event   . From probability theory, the probability of event    is written as: 
 
                                  (2-1) 
 
Where      denotes probability and     is a cross impact factor representing the degree 
of probabilistic contribution of event    to event   . This factor is calculated by fault tree 
analysis of event   . The probability that event    occurs due to interdependencies is 
distinguished and determined as     . Since    is the event that    occurs due to water 
system alone, not interdependency, events    and   are mutually exclusive. From 
probability theory and Equation 2-1, both      and          , therefore, represent the 
probability that event     occurs due to interdependencies. The cross impact factor is then 
obtained as: 
 
                (2-2) 
  
In this case, the cross impact factor represents the degree of interdependency between the 
electric power system and the pumping station. It also indicates the effectiveness of the 
backup generator.  
This study introduced fundamental concepts of probabilistic analysis of lifeline 
interdependency. It should be noted that only component-level analysis of functional 
interdependency was considered by Nojima and Kameda (1991). However, there are 
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many situations for which failures of a lifeline system affect overall functionality of other 
lifeline systems, not just specific components. For example, failure of the SCADA 
system that controls the electric power grid may not affect the operation state of specific 
electric substations, but performance of the entire system may be adversely affected. 
Without real-time information from SCADA systems, the electric power control center 
may have difficulties maintaining system stability. 
 Infrastructure interdependencies do not attract the interest of earthquake engineers 
alone. Since continuous operation of these systems is critical, their vulnerability and 
reliability are of interest to researchers in broader fields.  
From the system science perspective, infrastructure interdependencies can be 
classified into four categories. Unlike the four categories defined by Nojima and Kameda 
(1991) that are based upon propagation effects onto other systems, system scientists 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001) classify infrastructure interdependencies based upon their types of 
relationship. The four classes of the interdependencies are defined as follows: 
 Class 1: Physical interdependency - Two infrastructures are physically 
interdependent if the state of each depends upon the material outputs of the other. For 
example, transportation and electric power systems are physically interdependent because 
power systems need transportation networks to transport coal from sources to coal-fired 
electric generator plants while transportation systems need power to illuminate and 
operate traffic signals. 
 Class 2:  Geographic interdependency - Infrastructures are geographically 
interdependent if a local environmental event can create state changes in them. An 
example of this interdependency is a common right-of-way of collocated elements of 
different infrastructures.   
 Class 3:  Cyber interdependency - Infrastructures exhibit cyber interdependency if 
their states depend on information transmitted through the information infrastructure. For 
example, the electric power system has a cyber interdependency because its operation is 
 17 
highly dependent on the state of the system, whose information is transmitted through 
SCADA systems. 
 Class 4:  Logical interdependency - Two infrastructures are logically 
interdependent if the state of each depends upon the state of the other via some 
mechanism that is not a physical, geographic, or cyber connection. Policy, legal, or 
regulatory regimes are common factors that affect logical linkages among infrastructures. 
In comparing the two sets of classifications, the latter is based upon types of the 
linkages among infrastructures, while the former considers the effects of 
interdependence. When detailed causes and effects of interdependencies are identified 
and modeled, the latter system science classification becomes more meaningful because it 
is based on the causes of the interdependencies. 
Since highly destructive earthquakes are considered rare events, historic records 
may be too scarce to be useful. Models and simulations may provide the only guidance 
for strategy or policy development (Rinaldi 2004). Models and simulations, such as 
dynamic simulations, agent-based modeling, and physics-based modeling, are 
recommended to address the complexity of these interdependencies. However, to develop 
accurate and reasonable models and simulations, each infrastructure system needs to be 
understood in depth. For example, electric power operation, as well as the fundamental of 
SCADA system, needs to be understood in detail before models and simulations are 
created; otherwise insights are too general and of limited application. For this reason, the 
task is not easy and multidisciplinary efforts are essential. 
Recently, models representing the interdependent responses of infrastructures to 
potential threats such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks have been developed in 
order to better understand their interactions since the records of the real responses are 
insufficient. Graph theory and statistical methods are widely employed to characterize 
and measure the performance of networked infrastructures. An important study by 
Dueñas-Osorio (Dueñas-Osorio 2005) uses fundamental topological properties including 
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mean distance, vertex degree, cluster coefficient, and redundancy ratio to describe 
infrastructure networks. Dueñas-Osorio also proposed generic network performance 
measures such as efficiency, connectivity loss, and service flow reduction to evaluate 
infrastructure network functionality after disruptions. Interdependencies between two 
infrastructures are represented by conditional probabilities. These methodologies are 
applied to electric power and water networks to demonstrate their applications (Dueñas-
Osorio 2005). Although this approach sheds light on the issues of interdependent network 
modeling in earthquake engineering, certain details, such as directions of flows and 
fragility function of the links or edges, yielded further refinements. A MAE Center 
research team later addressed some modeling issues, such as improving the algorithm and 
implemented them in the development of MAEViz, a seismic loss estimation tool (Kim et 
al. 2007). 
Although the approach proposed by Dueñas-Osorio (2005) and Kim et al. (2007) 
is developed for general networked infrastructures, some network properties and 
performance measurements, such as network flow reduction, are still limited to 
transmission and distribution networks: i.e., networked systems that transmit and 
distribute goods such as electric power, water, oil and gas networks. For other 
infrastructures such as information and telecommunication systems as well as personal 
transportation, these properties and measurements are not adequate to capture critical 
issues such as travel time and communication delays and congestion. In order to include 
telecommunication infrastructures in interdependent analysis, a new modeling approach 
is needed. 
Although, the interdependent telecommunication systems are not widely studied, 
there is growing public concern about reliability of telecommunication infrastructure. 
Due to a number of large telecommunication disruptions in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) required landline 
communication carriers to report service disruptions of at least 30 minutes in duration 
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and 30,000 customers affected since 1991 (Snow et al. 2006). From the FCC’s record, 
Snow et al. (2006)  analyze the frequency of telecommunication outages due to power 
loss. The research focuses on the reliability of the interdependent electric power and 
telecommunication systems before and after the terrorist attack on September 11
th
, 2001. 
The study utilizes probabilistic models, such as the power law model and the piecewise 
linear model, to determine interdependent reliability. The observed bilinear trend in the 
piecewise linear model concludes that the reliability improved after the attack. However, 
the study still shows strong correlation between electric power and telecommunication 
systems, especially in large-scale disruptions, such as the large blackout in August 2003. 
Besides this reliability study, the interdependency of electric power and 
telecommunication has also been studied in more detail. Rosato et al. (2008) investigated 
the consequence of electric power failure on an internet network. They simulated failure 
of power grids by eliminating power transmission lines and evaluated power reduction 
levels due to re-dispatching by using a DC power flow method. The functionality of the 
internet nodes was geographically related to neighboring electric power nodes. This study 
used a coupling coefficient,  , to model the strength of the interdependencies. The 
coupling coefficient ranged between 0 and 1, with 0  representing that internet nodes 
independent from power nodes, and 1  meaning that the functionality of internet 
nodes totally depends upon the power level from power nodes. The study also 
investigated Quality of Service (QoS) of the internet network at different data traffic 
levels, where QoS of the internet network is defined as the average delivery time of the 
data packet sending from origin nodes to destination nodes. The amount of traffic was 
represented by variable  , a fraction of the number of origin nodes that originate data 
packet to the network at each time step of the simulation. 
Although this study (Rosato et al. 2008) represents a first attempt among few 
studies which try to define methodologies to characterize the dependencies between 
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electric power and telecommunication systems, the results show some key insights into 
the coupling systems. The reduction in power level reduces the number of functioning 
internet nodes and degrades the QoS of the internet network. The results show that for 
intermediate coupling coefficient ( 75.0 ), the average delivery time of the internet 
network increases dramatically when the number of simultaneously removed 
transmission lines increases, especially at low amounts of traffic. 
2.3 Limitations of Existing Studies 
Previous research fails to adequately address specific modeling issues in order to 
achieve an understanding of the interdependent response of electrical power and 
telecommunication infrastructures to seismic hazards.  
First, although lifeline earthquake engineering has been studied for decades, there 
is limited research in the area of system performance of telecommunication networks. 
Most past studies have only focused on seismic performance of equipment and individual 
facilities. In addition, there are no reasonable network performance measures for 
characterizing the performance of telecommunication systems.  
Second, congestion and flow concentration issues in telecommunication systems 
are insufficiently addressed or omitted in previous studies of telecommunication lifelines. 
Effects of delays in communication need to be explored so that the efficiency of 
mitigation and recovery activities can be improved.  
Third, there is a lack of understanding of the interdependencies between electric 
power and telecommunication infrastructures. Although the physical dependencies (Class 
1 above) of telecommunication systems on electric power grids can be reasonably 
simulated by the procedure proposed by Dueñas-Osorio (2005) and Kim et al. (2007), 
new approaches are required to model cyber dependencies (Class 3) of power grids on 
telecommunication systems.  
 21 
Fourth, there is still inadequacy of the understanding the interdependent responses 
of the two infrastructures under seismic conditions. Even though Snow et al. (2006) and 
Rosato et al. (2008) have already investigated the interdependencies between electric 
power and telecommunication systems under normal conditions, the interdependent 
responses under seismic condition, which involves congestion issues due to abnormally 
high demand have not been addressed.  
Finally, inadequate treatment of the interaction between telecommunication and 
electric power systems results in overestimation of their seismic performance. Efficient 
mitigation and consequence minimization actions are not possible without considering 
these interdependencies.  
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CHAPTER 3  
EFFECTS OF SEISMIC HAZARD ON TELECOMMUNICATION 
AND ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
 
Earthquakes have brought devastation to critical infrastructure systems in many 
regions of the world. Electric power, telecommunication, and transportation systems are 
among the set of critical infrastructures that when disrupted by seismic hazard can greatly 
affect post-disaster recovery. Although seismic-induced physical damage is known to 
contribute to degradation of system performance of lifeline systems, data traffic 
congestion in telecommunication systems due to abnormally high demand is another 
effect from earthquakes which degrades system performance even further. 
This chapter first introduces the fundamentals of seismic hazards and describes 
mathematical models used to determine local seismic intensities and demands, such as 
peak ground acceleration (PGA) and peak ground velocity (PGV). Next, typical physical 
damage to electric power and telecommunication facilities due to seismic hazard are 
summarized along with the probabilistic models used to assess the seismic response and 
performance of such facilities. Finally, this chapter presents the background of traffic 
theory for telecommunication systems and proposes methods to estimate the effect of 
abnormally high user demand and retrial behavior of subscribers on telecommunication 
networks stressed by earthquake events. 
3.1 Seismic Hazard 
3.1.1 Seismic Hazard Characteristics 
Each earthquake has unique characteristics. Three components—earthquake 
sources, ground motion attenuation, and local soil amplification—are necessary to 
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determine seismic intensities at a given site when individual structures are analyzed for 
earthquake responses. However, infrastructure systems whose facilities are spatially 
distributed over a broad area also require that the spatial correlation of seismic intensities 
be considered (Adachi and Ellingwood 2009a, Jayaram and Baker 2009). 
Earthquake Source 
The earthquake source can succinctly be characterized by its epicenter and 
magnitude. Historical records and geographical information are normally used to identify 
earthquake sources in a target area. The location of earthquake epicenters is determined 
by earthquake records and locations of faults, while the frequency of earthquakes with a 
particular magnitude is estimated using earthquake records and the Gutenberg-Richter 
recurrence law. 
Gutenberg and Richter (1949) proposed the recurrence law to first model the 
frequency of earthquakes in California. The law expresses the relationship between 
earthquake magnitude and frequency of the events. The Gutenberg-Richter recurrence 
law for earthquakes whose magnitude is not less than  in any given area is given by: 
 
            (3-1) 
 
where   is the number of earthquakes in any given period. Parameters   and   are the 
recurrence parameters which are determined from earthquake records in that area. These 
parameters are different for different geographic regions.  
Ground Motion Attenuation 
Ground motion attenuation represents the propagation of seismic waves from the 
earthquake source to any given site. Attenuation depends greatly on the geological 
environment and path between earthquake and target sites. The construction of 
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attenuation relationship is based on the records of earthquakes in an area with similar 
geology and on the concepts of random vibrations. A number of attenuation relationships 
are available for different regions. Some attenuation relationships for Western North 
America have been proposed by Abrahamson and Silva (1993), Archuleta et al. (1979), 
and Campbell and Bozorgnia (1994). Campbell (2003), Atkinson and Boore (2006), and 
Hwang and Huo (1997) provide attenuation relationships for Eastern and Central North 
America.  
Normally, attenuation relationships provide mean or median values of local 
seismic intensities, such as PGA and PGV, as functions of earthquake magnitude and 
distance from the sites to earthquake epicenter. Due to its complexity and focus on point 
estimates, ground motion attenuation is one of the major sources of uncertainty in seismic 
risk assessment of spatially distributed infrastructure systems (Adachi and Ellingwood 
2009a). 
Local Soil Amplification 
Local seismic intensities are dependent on local soil conditions. The seismic 
waves propagating from earthquake sources can either be amplified or damped due to 
geotechnical properties of the soil at the evaluated site. In engineering practice, the 
effects of local soil conditions are represented by local soil amplification factors. The 
seismic intensity obtained from attenuation relationships are multiplied directly by these 
factors to determine the surface seismic intensity at a site of interest.  
FEMA (2004) categorizes the local soil amplification factor for six classes of soil 
condition—hard rock, rock, dense soil, stiff soil, soft clay, and soil requiring site-specific 
evaluation—in the 2003 National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) 
provisions. FEMA proposed these factors mostly based on the studies from earthquake 
records in the Western United States (Hwang et al. 1997). However, there is still a lack of 
study of the local soil amplification effects in other regions.  
 25 
Similar to the ground motion attenuation, the soil amplification factor is another 
source of uncertainty in seismic risk assessment. The inherent uncertainty of the 
representation of local soil effects should be recognized. Sensitivity of the soil 
amplification factors to seismic performance assessment of infrastructural systems has 
been studied by (Adachi and Ellingwood 2009b).  
Spatial Correlation of Seismic Intensities 
The functionality of infrastructure systems depends on the individual 
functionalities of their facilities which are spatially distributed over a geographical area. 
Seismic intensities at the sites of these facilities are stochastically dependent on location 
and their covariance should be considered when assessing seismic performance of 
infrastructure systems (Adachi and Ellingwood 2009a, Jayaram and Baker 2009). The 
covariance of seismic intensities between two sites is typically presented as an 
exponential function of the distances between the sites, as in the studies by Shimomura 
and Takada (2004), Takada and Shimomura (2004), Wang and Takada (2005), and 
Adachi and Ellingwood (2009a), and Jayaram and Baker (2009) .   
Hence, when studying geographically distributed systems, four components 
emerge—earthquake source, ground motion attenuation, local soil amplification, and 
spatial correlation of seismic intensities—as necessary to specify seismic hazard at any 
given infrastructure site. Two procedures commonly used for seismic hazard analysis are 
presented in the following section, and their adequacy for utility systems is discussed.  
3.1.2 Seismic Hazard Analyses   
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) is a commonly used method to 
determine local seismic intensity at any given sites for design, analysis for retrofit, or 
seismic risk management. PSHA determines local seismic intensities by aggregating all 
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possible earthquake sources which are likely to affect the sites of interest. Local seismic 
intensities due to each seismic source are evaluated using the first three seismic hazard 
characteristics—earthquake source, ground motion attenuation, and local soil 
amplification. At a site, these intensities are weighted by their probability of occurrence. 
The annual recurrence rates of earthquakes with any specific magnitude are calculated 
from the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law.  From the annual recurrence rates and the 
assumption that earthquake recurrence is a Poisson process, probabilistic seismic hazard 
maps showing seismic intensities (PGA, PGV, spectral velocity, or spectral acceleration) 
can be created for a specified probability of exceedance in a certain return period 
(McGuire 1995). The probabilistic seismic hazard maps used in engineering practice are 
consistently available in regulatory provisions (Adachi 2007). 
Although probabilistic seismic hazard maps are used for design, analysis, retrofit, 
and seismic risk assessment of individual facilities, they are not suitable for seismic risk 
assessment of infrastructure systems whose functionalities are dependent upon spatially 
distributed facilities, since the spatial correlation of seismic intensities is lost in the 
aggregation process of the PSHA process (Adachi 2007).      
Scenario Earthquake based Seismic Hazard Analysis 
In contrast to PSHA, a scenario earthquake based seismic hazard analysis 
(SESHA) is a conditional seismic hazard analysis based on a specific earthquake event. 
Local seismic intensities are determined from a specific earthquake source (deterministic 
magnitude and epicentral location) using ground motion attenuation, local soil 
amplification, and spatial correlation of seismic intensities. One significant advantage of 
the SESHA over the PSHA is that SESHA can reveal specific details of earthquake risk 
for distributed facility sites. Therefore, SESHA is often used to investigate effects of a 
specific earthquake in the past. This application is useful for highly seismic active 
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regions. However, SESHA is not so useful in the regions where the seismic occurrence 
rate is moderate and low (McGuire 2001).     
One of the difficulties of applying SESHA for seismic risk assessment is to justify 
earthquake scenarios to be used in the analysis. Normally, major historical earthquakes 
are used as scenario earthquakes in high seismic regions; however, this is not the case for 
moderate and low seismic regions. In such regions, a specific earthquake scenario is 
selected from the deaggregation analysis of the potential earthquakes surrounding the 
areas. The United State Geological Survey, USGS (2009), provides interactive 
deaggregation tools for selecting events for SESHA. 
3.1.3 Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale 
The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) is preferred over other seismic intensity 
indexes when seismic-induced communication demands are concerned because it is a 
scale measuring local seismic intensities based on the effects of earthquakes on human 
and man-made structures. The scale quantifies seismic intensity on a scale from I through 
XII. The MMI scale is subdivided into two ranges. The intensity levels of I through VII 
are based on human perception of ground shaking, while the higher intensity levels are 
based on the observed damage to man-made structure due to earthquakes. Although the 
MMI scale was not developed from any scientific background, it depicts well the 
severities of ground shaking at sites. The MMI scale is also meaningful to nonscientific 
audiences for this reason. 
This research relates the MMI scale to the behavior of telephone subscribers 
reacting to earthquakes and quantifies communication demand on telecommunication 
infrastructures due to seismic hazard. Detailed discussions of seismic communication 
demand and corresponding seismic intensities are presented later in this chapter.  
Since PGA and PGV are used extensively when seismic-induced physical damage 
is referred to, it is logical to map the MMI scale to equivalent PGA or PGV at typical 
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sites. The MMI scale and corresponding PGA and PGV provided by Bolt (1993) are 
reproduced and presented in Table 3-1. 
 








I Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable 
circumstances. 
  
II Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of 
buildings. Delicately suspended objects may swing. 
  
III Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings, 
but many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing 
automobiles may rock slightly. Vibration like passing of truck. 
Duration estimated. 
  
IV During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night some 
awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make creaking 
sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standing 
automobiles rocked noticeably. 
0.015-0.02 1-2 
V Felt by nearly everyone, many awakened. Some dishes, windows, and 
so on broken; cracked plaster in a few places; unstable objects 
overturned. Disturbances of trees, poles, and other tall objects 
sometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop. 
0.03-0.04 2-5 
VI Felt by all, many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy furniture 
moved; a few instances of fallen plaster and damaged chimneys. 
Damage slight. 
0.06-0.07 5-8 
VII Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in buildings of good 
design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary 
structures; considerable in poorly built or badly designed structures; 
some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving cars. 
0.10-0.15 8-12 
VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in 
ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse; great in poorly 
built structures. Panel walls thrown out of frame structures. Fall of 
chimneys, factory stack, columns, monuments, and walls. Heavy 
furniture overturned. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts. 
Changes in well water. Persons driving cars disturbed. 
0.25-0.30 20-30 
IX Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed 
frame structures thrown out of plumb; great in substantial buildings, 
with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground 
cracked conspicuously. Underground pipes broken. 
0.50-0.55 45-55 
X Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and 
frame structures destroyed with foundations; ground badly cracked. 
Rails bent. Landslides considerable from riverbanks and steep slopes. 
Shifted sand and mud. Water splashed, slopped over banks. 
> 0.60 > 60 
XI Few, if any, (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. 
Broad fissures in ground. Underground pipelines completely out of 
service. Earth slumps and land slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly. 
  
XII Damage total. Waves seen on ground surface. Lines of sight and level 
distorted. Objects thrown into the air. 
  
Source: Bolt, Bruce A. Abridged Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, Earthquakes - Newly Revised and 
Expanded, Appendix C, W.H. Freeman and Co. 1993, 331 pp 
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3.2 Damage to Network Components Due to Earthquake 
Experience from past earthquakes indicates that the most obvious effect of an 
earthquake on infrastructure facilities is physical damage to building structures and their 
contents which directly influences their functionality. Also, researchers have shown 
damage to infrastructure components from records of past earthquakes, where electric 
power systems and telecommunication systems are of particular interest (Schiff 1995, 
Tang and Schiff 1996, Tang 1998, Schiff 2004). A probabilistic model for risk 
assessment of network components is also discussed in this section. 
3.2.1 Damage to Electric Power System components 
For the purpose of earthquake investigations, electric power transmission network 
components are classified into 4 categories—control centers, generation facilities, 
substations, and transmission lines. Each component contains different equipment and 
performs specific functions. Earthquake-induced damage to each of these components is 
also different. Some common effects of earthquake to each of them are presented next.  
Control Center 
A control center is a central facility that provides overall system control of 
electric power grids in a geographical area. The control center provides crucial functions 
for reliable power grid operation even though it doesn’t directly generate or transmit any 
electric power. The control center receives measurement data monitored and transmitted 
from local facilities which are spatially distributed, estimates the status of the entire 
system, and transmits appropriate commands back to the local facilities in order to 
maintain reliability and stability of system operation. Unlike water or gas distribution 
systems, power grids have no capability of storage exceeding generated power. Therefore 
the critical goal of the control center is to maintain an instantaneous balance of generated 
power and load (power demand) at all times.   
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Typically, a control center is a room located in a building classified as an 
important facility. Although the host building is specially designed to withstand 
earthquakes or any other threats, the functionality of the control center is dependent upon 
its critical equipments. Normally, a control center is equipped with control consoles, 
display equipments, computers, communication equipments, and other support systems, 
such as heat, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, and emergency power 
systems. Each of the contents in a control center is vital to its functionality. 
In practice, the floor of the control room is an access floor or a raised floor to 
accommodate wiring of the systems. This type of flooring does not perform well in 
earthquake environments. One of the common failures of a control center due to 
earthquakes is the collapse of the floor which results in damage to the equipment resting 
on it. The failure of other non-structural components, such as suspended ceilings, backup 
generators, or HVAC systems, also affects the efficiency of control centers. This creates 
unsafe environments for operators to occupy the control center and operate the power 
grid. 
Power Generation Facilities 
Generation facilities are the facilities where other forms of energy are converted 
to electric power. There are several types of generation facilities, such as fossil power 
plants, nuclear power plants, hydropower plants, and solar power plants. However, the 
majority of power consumed in the US as of 2010 comes from fossil power plants. 
Therefore, this section will address fossil power plants only (USEIA 2009). 
Fossil power plants generate electric power by burning fossil fuel, such as coal, 
oil, and gas, either to boil water and generate high pressure steam to drive turbines, or to 
drive turbines directly with combustion gas from burning fuel, or by a combination of the 
two. A fossil power plant consists of main components, including fuel and chemical 
storage tasks, water boilers, combustion or stream turbines, piping, and duct work. These 
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components are essential to the operation of the facility and are also vulnerable to strong 
ground motion. Damage to these components, such as liquid storage tanks leaking, water 
boilers leaking, damage to turbine thrust bearings, and rupture of high pressure piping or 
duct work breaking, can disrupt facility operation. Beside these components, most power 
plants also include control rooms which function similar to control centers except they 
are used to control only the plant and not entire grid systems. Since control rooms in a 
power plant are also vulnerable to seismic hazard, the same failure modes for control 
centers apply to them, as seen in past earthquakes. 
Electric Substations 
Substations serve vital functions in electric power systems. Besides transforming 
voltage between transmission and distribution networks, they also provide protection to 
transmission lines, equipment, and the entire system. Substations are equipped with 
sensing devices for monitoring the condition of the system. During an abnormal event, 
substations are informed by these devices and control centers to isolate transmission lines 
or equipment from the system and prevent them and the system from large disruptions. 
The key equipment normally found in substations are circuit breakers, disconnect 
switches, and transformers. Each of these equipments is vulnerable to strong ground 
motion. There are three main failure modes of these equipments commonly found after 
earthquakes: failure of porcelain insulating components, failure of cast-aluminum 
components, and failure of equipment anchorage. Since porcelain and cast-aluminum 
have preferable electrical properties, they are widely used in equipment found in typical 
substations. However, they do not perform well in cyclic loading condition caused by 
earthquakes due to their brittle mechanical properties. Failure of equipment anchorage is 
another common cause of equipment failure. Most equipment in substations has small 
footprints and high centers of gravity. High moments exerting on their anchorage at the 
base are therefore expected when they are subjected to earthquake forces. The failure of 
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equipment anchorage may also result in damage to the equipment due to rocking or 
tipping over. 
Transmission Lines 
In transmission power systems, high voltage transmission lines connect and 
deliver electric power to network components. They are normally supported by steel 
frame transmission towers. From past earthquake experience, transmission towers 
perform well. Only limited damage is found, and most is due to foundation failures, large 
ground displacement, and liquefaction (Schiff 1997). 
3.2.2 Damage to Telecommunication System Components 
From past earthquakes, telecommunication network components perform 
relatively well under seismic conditions. Nonetheless, failures of some components are 
still found following earthquake events. Common failures found in telecommunication 
network components are failures of electronic equipment, such as computers, server 
cabinets, switch boards, circuit boards, and battery racks. This equipment is vulnerable 
due to the various configurations, which are predominantly tall and slender. Without 
proper anchorage, they are likely to rock or overturn during an earthquake. This 
equipment is delicate and sensitive to motion. Accidental contact of dislodged circuit 
boards inside rocking equipments can result in severe damage of the equipments (Tang 
and Schiff 1996, Schiff 1997). 
 
3.2.3 Network Component Functionality Assessment 
Functionalities of infrastructural networks are dependent upon functionalities of 
their components. In order to assess infrastructure network performance, the functionality 
of individual network components is evaluated first. In real situations, a facility has 
multiple states of functionality—fully, partially, or non-functional. However, the non-
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functional state is the one of most concern. A network component can become non-
functional due to a series of events, such as damage to the facility building resulting in 
limited access to the facility, dislodged circuit boards, or disconnected cables. The 
concept of system reliability and fault tree analysis are frequently used to assess 
probabilistic functionality of infrastructure facilities and systems (FEMA 2004, 
Leelardcharoen 2005, Adachi 2007). 
A fault tree diagram is a representation of a failure event which consists of 
combined effects of several sub-events (Melchers 1999). A fault tree diagram typically 
consists of event blocks and operation gates. Two examples of fault tree diagrams are 
shown in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-1: Fault Tree Diagram of the Electrical Substation Failure 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the fault tree of the electric substation failure as described in 
FEMA (2004). This diagram suggests that the failure of an electric substation results 
from extensive damage to the substation building, 70% failure of disconnect switches, 
70% failure of circuit breakers, or 70% failure of transformers. Accordingly, the failure 
probability of a substation,                is calculated as follows:  
 
                                                            (3-2)  
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where           ,        ,         , and              represent the events of extensive 
damage to the substation building, 70% failure of disconnect switches, 70% failure of 
circuit breakers, and 70% failure of transformers, respectively. 
 
Figure 3-2: Fault Tree Diagram of Telephone Central Office Failure 
 
Figure 3-2 presents the fault tree diagram of the failure of a telephone central 
office as described in (FEMA 2004). The failure results from moderate damage to the 
central office structure, a dislodged digital switching board, or loss of electric power, 
where the loss of electric power results from the loss of backup power and commercial 
power at the same time. The following equation presents the mathematical representation 
of Figure 3-2. 
 
                                                             (3-3) 
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where        is the failure probability of a central office.           ,                 , 
       , and             are the events of moderate damage to the central office 
structure, dislodged digital switching board, lost of backup power, and commercial 
power, respectively. 
From fault tree analyses and the damage functions of sub-components, damage 
functions or fragility functions of network components are constructed. The functions are 
customarily fitted to a log normal distribution, so that they are represented by the two 
lognormal parameters—median and dispersion. The fragility function parameters of 
telecommunication and electric power network components as functions of PGA used in 
this research are listed in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2: PGA Related Network Component Fragility Function Parameters for 
Nonfunctional Limit State 
 Median (g) Dispersion 
Electric Power Network Components 
Gate Station (High Voltage Substation) 0.20 0.35 
23 kV Substation 0.35 0.40 
12 kV Substation 0.45 0.45 
Telecommunication Network Components 
Point of Presence 0.40 0.60 
Tandem Office 0.32 0.60 
End Office 0.26 0.50 
 
The parameters presented in Table 3-2 are based on the parameters proposed by 
FEMA (2004) with modifications to reflect a failure damage state and to include 
consideration of different structures for different types of central offices. For example, 
the structure of an end office is likely to be a small wood frame building while point of 
presence and tandem offices are 2-5 story concrete or steel frame buildings. The fragility 
functions are derived by included fragility function of these structures into the fault tree 
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analyses for telecommunication network components. The plots of these fragility 
functions are show in Figure 3-3. 
Experience from past earthquakes suggests that failures of transmission towers, 
lines, and telephone trunks are rare compared to other components (Schiff 1997). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume invulnerable power transmission towers and lines, 
and telephone trunks in this study. 
 
Figure 3-3: Failure Fragility Curves of Telecommunication and Electric Power Network 
Components 
3.3 Congestion in Telecommunication Systems Due to Earthquakes 
In telecommunication systems, it is uneconomical for physical resources such as 
switching and transmission facilities to be dedicated to each customer. There is only a 
small percentage of total customers who actually use the network or a portion of it at any 
given time.  Therefore, telecommunication networks are designed such that common 





































more customers are rejected or have to wait for connections, especially when 
communication demand becomes substantially higher than the design criteria.  
After earthquakes events, there is evidence of abnormally high demand for 
communication.  Some data have been collected from the 1994 Northridge and 1995 
Kobe earthquakes (Tang 1998). The data shows that one central office in the affected 
area of the Northridge earthquake had a 3-fold increase from normal in call attempts in 
the first day after the earthquake.  Moreover, the call attempts were over 10 times normal 
day attempts during peak periods. For the Kobe earthquake, the data was collected for the 
entire affected area. On the first day of the earthquake, there were approximately 50 times 
more call attempts from around Japan to the Kobe area than during a normal period. The 
call volume in the area was six times the normal volume three days after the earthquake 
and remained high several days after. 
It is clear that increase in communication demand following an earthquake can be 
substantial. Since the telecommunication systems are not normally designed for this 
extremely high demand, severe congestion in the systems is very likely. Some studies 
(O'Reilly et al. 2004, Jrad et al. 2005, O'Reilly et al. 2005, Jrad et al. 2007, O'Reilly et al. 
2007)  have demonstrated the significance of telecommunication system degradation in 
cases of emergency and disaster due to high demand and congestion. Therefore, 
congestion is another major effect besides direct physical damage from earthquakes on 
telecommunication systems which cannot be ignored. 
One major contributions of this research thesis is the development of a 
mathematical model to simulate calling profiles during abnormally high demand in 
communication systems due to earthquakes.  The profiles are meant to be used for the 
study of seismic performance of telecommunication networks. The model utilizes and 
modifies teletraffic theory because it captures the problem of congestion, which is 
normally expected after catastrophic events such as earthquakes. Some relevant concepts 
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in traffic theory are presented next. Prior to the detailed discussion of the model, the 
background of the traditional traffic theory for telecommunication systems is presented. 
3.3.1 Introduction to Traffic Theory 
Traffic theory, also referred to as teletraffic theory, was developed by A. K. 
Erlang, a Danish mathematician, at the beginning of the 20th century. It utilizes a branch 
of applied probabilistic theory since the demands of communication have stochastic 
characteristics. In the area of telecommunications, traffic is the flow of information 
through the telecommunication network. Although, concepts and techniques of traffic 
theory were developed for Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN), they can also apply 
to general traffic networks. 
Traffic Demand 
In traffic theory, traffic demand or offered load is defined by two parameters, the 
average arrival rate, , and the average holding time,. The average arrival rate,, is the 
average rate at which customers request services or pick up the telephone to make phone 
calls. The average holding time,, is the average time that one customer requires service 
or remains on a call. The offered load,  , is defined by the product of these two 
parameters and it is a dimensionless quantity whose numerical values are expressed in 
erlangs. 
 
   (3-4) 
 
For example, if 5 customers per minute want to use telephones and the average duration 
of each telephone call is 3 minutes, = 5 calls per minute and = 3 minutes per call, and 
the offered load, a, at the end office is then equal to 5×3=15 erlangs. This implies that the 
telephone switching equipment at the end office should have the capacity to serve at least 
a
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15 customers at the same time to ensure immediate service. In other words, offered load 
represents the average number of resources used by customers if there are enough 
resources available for all customers. 
In a PSTN, offered loads do not remain constant throughout the day and instead 
peak during certain times. Hence, PSTNs are usually engineered to meet a specific 
quality of service, or grade of service (GOS), at certain periods of the year. These periods 
are called busy season busy hours (BSBHs), which are the busiest clock hours of the 
busiest weeks of the year. For example, a GOS criterion for switching offices or trunks 
may state that, over the twenty BSBHs, no more than 1 percent of service requests should 
be rejected due to unavailable communication channels. Normally, PSTN service 
philosophy is to provide high-quality, economical service during normal, daily use of the 
network. However, providing enough equipment to handle infrequent peaks, such as 
during periods after earthquakes is generally considered to be far too costly. 
Blocking Probability 
During holiday seasons and natural disasters, it is possible that a large number of 
customers or subscribers request telephone service simultaneously. As noted above, the 
PSTN is not designed for these infrequent local peaks. It is likely that all resources or 
capacities are in use and some requests are denied or blocked. Subscribers are informed 
that their requests were blocked by the busy signal sent from end offices. In traffic 
theory, requests for telephone and, to use another example, banking services are 
considered in the same manner. For example, the analog to a busy signal in banking is 
when a bank customer finds all tellers busy. The customer has two choices: wait in line 
for service or leave and come back later – for the telephone service, the subscribers must 
hang up (i.e., leave) and try again later. This situation is sometimes called blocked-calls-
cleared or lost-calls-cleared, meaning calls leave the system immediately when they are 
blocked. 
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If a random load, a, is submitted to a system of capacity, c, such that blocked calls 
leave the system, fundamental assumptions of traffic theory state that the arrival 
distribution of calls follows a Poisson distribution and the holding time distribution 
follows a negative exponential distribution. As a result, the probability that an arriving 
call is blocked due to unavailable capacity can be expressed as  
 
   (3-5) 
 
Equation 3-5 is Erlang’s loss formula, also referred to as the Erlang-B formula, 
and    is the blocking probability. It should be noted that this formula is developed under 
the critical assumption that the offered load, a, is from an infinite or very large source and 
blocked calls never return to the system. For a finite source, the arrival rate, , tends to 
decrease after requests are served and leave the system, while Equation 3-5 is derived on 
the basis of a stationary arrival rate. However, blocked calls tend to return to the system, 
especially in emergency situations such as after earthquakes. Therefore, more general 
arrival rate should be higher than the one used to derive Equation 3-5. This study 
proposes an improvement of this model to assess system performance using a renewal 
process with Weibull distributions. A detailed discussion of the model is presented in the 
following sections.  
The blocking probability concept is useful for system design and performance 
evaluation. It was first developed to determine optimum numbers of servers in queuing 
system such as the number of cashiers in supermarkets, the number of tellers in banks, 
and the number of switches in a PSTN. Values of blocking probability corresponding to 
offered loads are set as a GOS to determine capacity of systems.  Besides application in 

















systems, especially for telecommunication systems. In this research study, the latter 
application is extensively used to quantify performance of telecommunication systems. 
3.3.2 Sources of Communication Demand after Earthquake 
Normally, communication demands in different areas are distinct depending upon 
the behavior and demographics of subscribers and their activities. In order to include this 
variation into the models of communication demands, a demographic signature of the 
target area is used. Total population, proportions of population subscribing to landline 
and mobile telephone services, and portions of migration population are used to justify 
different kinds of communication demands. 
In order to simulate call profiles after earthquakes, the reasons which trigger 
communication demand should be understood and characterized. The proposed model 
considers three major sources of communication demand after an earthquake.  
Source 1: Communication among Subscribers within Earthquake Affected Areas 
These communication demands represent the calls that originate from the 
subscribers in the earthquake affected areas, who are aware of the earthquake event and 
worry about other subscribers they know within the affected areas. Therefore, these 
demands are estimated from the number of subscribers in the affected areas. This type of 
demand tends to cause congestion to the entire PSTN and mobile telephone network in 
the affected areas. This demand registers to telecommunication system when the ground 
shaking level is strong enough so that some people in the affected area can feel it. This 
demand is assumed to increase with shaking intensity level and reaches the possibly 
maximum demand when the shake can be felt by all in the affected area. On the Modified 
Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale, the ground shaking levels which some people can feel are 
approximated at the intensities of III and the level at which all people can feel them is 
about VI. 
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Source 2: Communication between Emergency Service Agencies and Subscribers in 
Earthquake Affected Areas 
Earthquakes are destructive and always threaten public safety. Hence, one of the 
important sources of the communication demand is from people in the affected areas who 
need emergency attention. Generally, emergency calls are designed to be handled by a 
central location so that the request can be forwarded to proper dispatch units. Therefore, 
this kind of demand concentrates and causes congestion to the emergency response call 
center. This communication demand strongly depends on the severity of the earthquake. 
Emergency attention is critically important during severe earthquakes. It is logical to 
assume that the needs of the earthquake victims for emergency attention are directly 
dependent upon the level of destruction level of building structures and equipment. The 
proposed relationship between earthquake intensity and this communication demand is 
based on the assumption that the demand is triggered when some structures are damaged 
and reaches the maximum possible demand when the majority of the earthquake victims 
lives are threatened due to severe damage to structures. According to the MMI scale, an 
intensity of IV indicates that some damage starts to occur to poorly constructed building 
structures and the intensity level of VIII indicates that all people in the earthquake 
affected area will face a life threatening situation. 
Source 3: Communication Attempts from Subscribers outside the Earthquake Affected 
Area 
This kind of demand is normally expected following catastrophic events. The 
demand originates from subscribers who are not directly affected by the events but they 
are concerned about the safety of the victims. In order to quantify this demand, the 
migration population in earthquake affected areas is used under the assumption that 
migration population is likely to relate to the population outside the area. This type of 
demand is significant in the area with a large number of migration populations. Similar to 
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the demand for emergency attention and response, this demand causes congestion to a 
specific location that connects to long distance telephone networks or toll networks 
because local telephone networks generally connect to a toll network at a facility, so-
called the point of presence. Without feeling ground shaking, subscribers outside 
earthquake affected area learn about the earthquake event from national news and other 
media. Once earthquake events are reported on national news, the subscribers outside the 
area start to worry about their family, friends and acquaintances and make phone calls to 
check up on them. Since the subscribers outside the area have no detailed insight of the 
events, this kind of demand depends on their knowledge of earthquake consequences. It 
is assumed that the demand immediately reaches the maximum once the outside 
subscribers are informed about earthquake events from national media. From observation 
of past earthquakes reported on national media, strong ground motions are more likely to 
be reported than weak ones, and the smallest magnitude earthquakes reported on nation 
news have had magnitudes of 2.5 to 3.5 depending on the areas of the events. For 
example, within the New Madrid Seismic Zone, an earthquake of magnitude 2.8 has been 
the weakest earthquake reported on national media. The shake was centered about 40 
miles north of Memphis, TN on January 16, 2009 (The Associated Press 2009). 
In general, intensities of earthquake events reported in the media are referred to 
using Richter or moment magnitudes. However, it is logical to convert the Richter scale 
values to corresponding seismic demands, such as PGA and PGV and then MMI, to be 
consistent with the other two demand sources and physical damage to structures. Seismic 
intensities corresponding to this source strongly depends on local earthquake 
characteristics, so the intensity level cannot be specifically pre-assigned as with the other 
demand sources. The corresponding seismic demands can be calculated using attenuation 
relationships and local soil amplification factors of the target area as described earlier in 
this chapter. 
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3.3.3 Probabilistic Model for Earthquake Communication Demand 
In traffic theory, arrival rate and holding time of the call are two main ingredients 
of the communication demand.  During normal days, offered loads tends to be random 
and normally modeled using a Poisson process and negative exponential distribution for 
arrival process and holding time distributions, respectively. However, after earthquakes, 
it is possible that a large number of subscribers request communication service 
simultaneously. In such a situation, a Poisson process and negative exponential 
distribution are not valid (AT&T Bell Laboratories 1983). Poisson processes have 
constant rate of time between events (memoryless property) which contradicts with 
heterogeneous arrival process. The time between each call arriving to the system tends to 
be much shorter than normal during catastrophic events. The holding time also becomes 
shorter and more predictable. The probability of finding long call conversation is less. 
Thus, to better describe such an abnormal communication pattern after earthquakes, a 
renewal process and the Weibull distribution are used to simulate earthquake call 
profiles, given their ability to handle more general cases and relax typical teletraffic 
arrival rate and holding time assumptions.  
Another important characteristic of communication demand in emergency 
situations is retrial attempts. After earthquakes, a higher blocking probability is 
commonly expected in telecommunication systems. The call attempts which are blocked 
have higher probability of returning to the system, especially in emergency situation. The 
retrial attempts increase the arrival rate of the communication demand and cause more 
severe congestion. 
In order to simulate the effects of abnormally high demand after earthquakes, all 
three components, arrival rate, holding time, and retrial, need to be simultaneously 
modeled and justified. The discussions of communication demand of each individual 
component are thus presented with numerical examples. 
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Arrival Rate and Interarrival Time for Seismic Communication Demand 
Although arrival rate is meaningful for the traditional traffic theory, its inverse 
provides better probabilistic interpretation when a renewal process is used instead of the 
Poison process. Therefore, interarrival time—the time between the occurrences of call 
attempts—is discussed, instead of arrival rate, in this section.  
A Poisson process is a renewal process whose interarrival time is described by the 
exponential probability distribution function, whereas a renewal process is a 
generalization of the Poisson process with arbitrary interarrival time distribution input. 
Due to its constant rate parameter, the exponential distribution is not a good probabilistic 
model to represent the interarrival time of call attempts after earthquake events.  
The term, rate, sometimes referred to as hazard rate or failure rate, is an 
important characteristic function of a positive continuous random variable which 
represents the lifetime of an event. In this case, the event is referred to as the event that 
no call attempt arrives to the system after the arrival of the last call. The rate function, 
    , of a cumulative distribution function (CDF),     , is defined by 
 
      
    
      
 (3-6) 
 
where      represents the probability density function (PDF) corresponding to       . 
From equation 3-6,      is also interpreted as the conditional probability density function 
that the event of age   will end in the next moment. 
After an earthquake, the interarrival time tends to decrease dramatically and the 
chance of finding long interarrival time ending in the next moment is more than the 
shorter one ending in the next moment. This means not only that the interarrival time 
becomes much less after an earthquake but also that the rate of longer interarrival times 
ending in the next moment should be higher. Therefore, the probabilistic distribution 
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representing the seismic interarrival time of call should demonstrate this characteristic, 
which departs from the traditional constant rate models. 
The Weibull distribution is commonly used to model lifetime of an event due to 
its flexibility of adjusting the rate of the distribution. Its PDF, CDF and rate function are 
given by 
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in which   and   are the parameters of the distribution.   is referred to as the shape 
parameter and   is referred to as the scale parameter. Both parameters are positive real 
numbers. It can be seen that      increases over   when    , decreases over   when 
   , and it is constant over   when    . It should be also noted that a exponential 
distribution with mean   is a special case Weibull distribution with parameters   and 
   . 
The proposed model utilizes the Weibull distribution to simulate the interarrival 
time distribution of the call attempts after earthquakes by varying the distribution 
parameters for different seismic intensities and sources of communication demands. A 
numerical example illustrates the application of the Weibull distribution on the 
interarrival time distribution of call attempts after earthquake. The example demonstrates 
the calculation of the interarrival time Weibull distribution of a central office in the 
metropolitan area of Shelby County, Tennessee. 
In July of 2008, the Shelby County population was estimated to be about 907,000 
(Population Division 2009). About 26.7% of the total population is a migration 
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population.  In the United States, there are about 142 telephone subscribers (both fixed 
and wireless telephones) per 100 people (International Telecommunication Union 2009). 
Therefore, the total number of both fixed and wireless telephone subscribers is estimated 
to be about                           in the Shelby County area. According to 
Central Office Lookup Tools (Marigold Technologies 2007), there are 34 telephone 
central offices serving in the area (37,760 subscribers per central office). During normal 
busy hours, it is assumed that the offered load is 0.083 erlangs per subscriber (Jrad et al. 
2005) or about 0.0166 calls per minute for the average holding time of 5 minutes. For one 
central office, the offered load is                    erlangs or about 627 calls per 
minute for 5minutes average holding time. To satisfy the typical standard GOS of 
maximum 1 percent blocking probability for any given route of a telephone call during a 
busy hour, a central office in Shelby County is designed to serve 3,320 subscribers at the 
same time according to Equation 3-5. 
From the demographic signature of Shelby County area and the assumptions of 
the seismic communication sources, the maximum numbers of possible call attempts 
from the three sources at different seismic intensity levels are estimated as follows: 
Source 1: Communication among Subscribers within Earthquake Affected Areas  
At the seismic intensity from III to VI in the MMI scale (equivalent to a PGA of 
up to 0.05g), all people in the earthquake affected area feel the ground motion and 
produce the maximum possible call demands. It is an easy task to estimate the amount of 
the demands, while the accuracy of the estimation depends on availability of information, 
such as telephone usage records or surveys on telephone subscriber behavior. However, 
due to the absence of such information, some assumptions are made in this study, so that 
the application of the proposed method can be numerically demonstrated. In this 
example, it is assumed that each subscriber has a close relationship to three other 
subscribers on average. This assumption is based on the average estimated family size of 
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3.19 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009) which is rounded up to 4 members per family. Each 
subscriber is assumed to make a phone call to each family member after an earthquake 
occurring during work hours when the family members are not together. This implies that 
each subscriber makes three phone calls within a certain period right after feeling ground 
shaking (within the first hour after the major shock, in this case). The average number of 
call attempts becomes                   calls per minute per central office (about 
3 times the design load) or 0.00053 minute average interarrival time. A linear increase of 
arrival rates is assumed from the design arrival rate at the seismic intensity III (equivalent 
to PGA of 0.010g) to the arrival rate of 1,888 calls per minute. The linearity assumption 
should be refined when more information becomes available in the future. The scale 
parameter of this source (equivalent to exponential mean of interarrival time) is defined 
by 
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To simulate the increasing rate of the interarrival time distribution the shape parameter is 
defined by 
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Source 2: Communication between Emergency Service Agencies and Subscribers in 
Earthquake Affected Areas 
The maximum possible arrival rate for this type of demand occurs at the seismic 
intensity of VIII (equivalent to a PGA of 0.25g). The magnitude of the demand is 
calculated according to the assumption that a subscriber in the area requires one 
emergency call within the first 15 minutes right after the major shock or 
                calls per minutes per central office. This assumption is based on the 
fact that requests for several emergency services can be done in one call since emergency 
call centers are interconnected to several emergency service providers. The relatively 
shorter period for this source of demand is assumed to reflect the emergency situation. 
For the emergency call rate at the seismic intensity IV (equivalent to PGA of 0.015g) and 
lower which is not yet triggered by ground shaking is assumed to be the normal day 
emergency call rate which is about 2.09 calls per subscriber per year (O'Reilly et al. 
2005) or about 0.15 calls per minute per central office. By assuming a linear increasing of 
the arrival rate over seismic intensity levels beyond normal operation, the scale 
parameter,    , can be defined by 
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For emergency call in the catastrophic events, the rate of interarrival time is assumed to 
be 2.0 for the maximum possible load and 1.0 (exponential distribution) for the normal 
day emergency calls. This assumption can be updated when more information becomes 
available. Thus     is defined by 
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Source 3: Communication Attempts from Subscribers outside the Earthquake Affected 
Area 
The nature of this demand is similar to the first demand except the magnitude of 
the load depends on the number of migration population, not the total population. By 
assuming 3 calls per migration subscribers within 60 minutes, the maximum possible 
arrival rate is 504 calls per minute per central office or 0.00198 minute interarrival time. 
For the normal day toll offered load which is not triggered by earthquake news, the load 
is about 7% of the local call (Liu 1980) which is about 44 calls per minute per central 
office. Hence, for this example     and     are defined by 
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and 
           
                
                
  (3-15) 
 
It can be seen that a seismic demand of 0.02g is the level corresponding to a 
moment magnitude of 3.5 in the Shelby County area which triggers some level of 
national news coverage.  
It should be noted that this numerical example is created from the best available 
records of the usage of a typical PSTN and the demographic signature of the affected area 
from the literature. By adjusting parameters of the Weibull distributions, a more accurate 
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model can be obtained from fitting a more detailed usage record of the targeted network 
to the input probability distributions. 
Holding Time for Seismic Communication Demand 
Similar to interarrival times, holding times after earthquakes tend to become 
shorter than those on the normal day due to the nature and the purpose of the call. A 
majority of telephone calls during emergencies have a specific objective, such as to report 
the emergency situation or to inquire about the status of family members. Normal daily 
calls have a wider variety of purposes such as conference calls which can be more than an 
hour long to normal business calls which may be only 3-5 minutes long. The use of the 
Weibull distribution over the exponential distribution repeats for the holding time. The 
longer calls tend to have higher probability of ending. Since the rate of the holding time 
distribution is expected to increase over time, the Weibull distribution with increasing 
rate is more suitable than an exponential distribution with constant rate.  
There is not so much variation in the holding time distribution relative to the 
interarrival times across demand sources, although the nature of the communication 
differs from the regular phone calls on normal days. Holding time for a call must be long 
enough to exchange necessary information. Therefore, in this model, the scale parameters 
of the holding time distribution,   , for all three communication sources are assumed 
constant while minor variation is applied to shape parameters,   ,  to adjust the rates of 
the distributions. The Weibull distribution parameters for the holding time of the three 
sources corresponding to the interarrival rate for the numerical example are defined as 
follows: 
Source 1: Communication among Subscribers within Earthquake Affected Areas 
 
         (3-16) 
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Source 2: Communication between Emergency Service Agencies and Subscribers 
in Earthquake Affected Areas 
 
         (3-18) 
         (3-19) 
 
Source 3: Communication Attempts from Subscribers outside the Earthquake 
Affected Area 
 
         (3-20) 
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These parameters are extrapolated from normal day communication demand 
parameters. They will be used to simulate the effects of high demand on a central office. 
The effects of all demand variability are presented and discussed in the following section. 
It should be stressed that the presented parameters can be adjusted when pertinent records 
and additional data of system performance under distress conditions become available in 
the future. 
Retrial Attempts of Seismic Communication Demand 
In the event of an earthquake when telecommunication systems are overloaded, it 
is likely that several call attempts are blocked due to unavailable servers. These blocked 
calls tend to come back to the system as retrial attempts. Jrad et al. (2007) demonstrate 
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that retrial attempts are likely in the case of emergencies and significantly affect the 
performance of telecommunication systems.   
There are two components of the retrial attempt model, probability of retrial and 
interarrival time of retrial attempts. Liu (1980) distinguishes retrial attempt probability 
for different reasons of blocking during the normal day operation from available records 
(e.g., no answer, busy, equipment blockage and failure, among others). Jrad et al. (2007) 
suggest an 80% probability of retrial attempt for calls in emergency situation. In this 
model, the 80% probability makes sense only for the communication within the 
earthquake area and the communication from outside. However, 100% probability retrial 
attempt is more appropriate for the communication between subscribers and emergency 
response centers due to the necessity and urgency of the calls. 
The interarrival time of retrial attempts is defined as the time between the 
unsuccessful attempt and the following attempt. From the available records of retrial in a 
normal day (Liu 1980), the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution for retrial attempt 
interarrival time,   , is 0.470. Due to the limitation of the records, it is assumed that the 
retrial behavior of each source has similar characteristic, so    is assumed the same for 
all sources. In order to simulate the retrial after earthquakes, scale parameters are 
assigned for each of the communication sources as follows 
Source 1: Communication among Subscribers within Earthquake Affected Areas 
 
          (3-22) 
 
Source 2: Communication between Emergency Service Agencies and Subscribers 
in Earthquake Affected Areas 
 
          (3-23) 
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Source 3: Communication Attempts from Subscribers outside the Earthquake 
Affected Area 
 
          (3-24) 
 
The presented scale parameters are selected on the basis of median interarrival retrial 
time assumptions. For the first and the third sources, the mean of 15 minutes interarrival 
retrial time is assumed while the mean of 5 minutes is for the second sources. These 
assumptions are based on the work of (Liu 1980). 
Effects of Seismic Communication Demand on Network Components 
From the proposed probabilistic model of the communication attempts, the effect 
of abnormally high communication demand due to earthquakes can be studied. Since the 
communication demands from each source respond to earthquake intensity differently, 
and they are introduced to telecommunication systems simultaneously, numerical 
simulation becomes a preferable method to estimate the effects of the high demand on 
telecommunication systems. The numerical simulation methods also allow modeling of 
details, such as the delay of the third source of communication due to the national news 
distributions, and retrial attempts, to be included in the study. More insights on how each 
communication source contributes to the performance of the systems and the effects of 
retrial attempt can be observed from numerical experiments. 
The examples of the interarrival time, holding time and retrial attempts presented 
earlier are simulated and input into a typical central office designed for the Shelby 
County area with the capacity of serving 3,320 calls simultaneously. Some of the results 
are presented and discussed below. 
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Figure 3-4: Component Blocking Probability due to Renewal and Poisson Seismic 
Communication Demand Models with and without Retrial Attempts 
 
Figure 3-4 shows the plot between seismic demand in term of PGA and blocking 
probability of a central office subjected to four different communication demands—the 
traditional traffic theory demand (Poisson process demand model) with and without 
retrial attempts, and the proposed renewal demands with heterogeneous times with and 
without retrial attempts. While the renewal demands as defined in the previous section 
have distinct rates of variability, the traditional traffic theory demand is assumed to 
increase linearly from the designed load of the central office (3,134 erlangs) to 4 times 
the load between 0.01g and 0.25g PGA (Houck et al. 2004). The linearity implies that the 
number of subscribers participating in the demand varies linearly over the intensity of 
ground shaking. The traditional Poisson load is quantified using the traffic overloading 
scenario in the study of Houck et al. (2004). This scenario was defined to simulate the 
effects of a disaster situation on telecommunication systems which is considered to be the 
maximum possible demand on the system in this example. The retrial attempt model for 
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the traditional load is based on Liu (1980) which is identical to retrial in sources 1 and 3 
of the renewal model as defined earlier. 
Each curve in Figure 3-4 is plotted from the result of the numerical simulation 
process starting from a given seismic intensity level (PGA). Then, the parameters of the 
Weibull distributions (renewal process model) or exponential distributions (Poisson 
process model) for interarrival time, holding time, and retrial interarrival time are 
determined from Equation 3-10 to Equation 3-24. From the appropriate distributions and 
the parameters corresponding to the selected PGA, a call profile (including the time when 
each call arrives at a central office and the length of each call) is generated randomly 
following the probability distributions and inserted into a central office. If lines or 
channels are available when a call arrives, the call enters the central office and it is 
counted as a successful call. The number of available lines is reduced by one. Then, the 
call exits the system after it stays in the system for the length of the call and the line or 
channel becomes available. If there is no line available when a call arrives, the arriving 
call is counted as a blocked call and reenters the queue in the profile. The time that the 
blocked call returns to the system is randomly generated following the retrial interarrival 
time distribution (Equation 3-22 through Equation 3-24). At the end of each call profile, 
the blocking probability of the component is calculated. These steps are repeated several 
times to obtain probability distribution of blocking probability for each PGA level. 
Finally, a mean blocking probability is plotted for each PGA to create the curves in 
Figure 3-4 
From the plot, it can be seen that the Poisson process curves are fairly smooth as a 
result from the linear increase in offered load; however, the renewal process curves show 
some shape transitions. There are three noticeable transitions in each renewal process 
curve. These transitions are caused by the recognition of different sources of seismic-
induced communication demand. 
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The first transition observed at PGA = 0.05g (intensity III in the MMI scale) 
indicates that demand source 1 reaches its maximum possible amount because all 
subscribers have participated in this source of communication demand. For PGA = 0.05g 
and greater, the parameters of the renewal process of source 1 stay constant. Therefore, 
the increase in blocking probability beyond such PGA level is caused solely by the 
demand source 2 because the number of subscribers who need emergency attention still 
increases with seismic intensity as a result of increase in structural damage. 
Another transition in the renewal process curves occur at PGA = 0.25g (intensity 
VIII in the MMI scale) where the demand source 2 reaches its maximum possible 
amount. This is because all subscribers have tried to access telecommunication system 
according to the assumption that all subscribers need emergency attention after subjected 
to a PGA = 0.25 or greater. The blocking probability does not increase further since all 
sources have reached their maximum possible amount of demand. The renewal process 
model parameters do not change even if the seismic intensity increases.  
The last transition is expected at PGA = 0.02g where the demand source 3 is 
triggered by news report. This sudden exertion of the demand results in the increase in 
blocking probability by about 1%. This increase may vary depending on the demographic 
and seismic signature of the target area. 
The plot also shows significantly greater significant effects of retrial attempts on 
the renewal demand than the traditional demand. Retrial attempts increase blocking 
probabilities of the renewal demand by up to 15% while the traditional demand shows 
only 10% difference. Although the retrial characteristic of the traditional demand and 
majority of the renewal demand are the same, the higher retrial rate and higher retrial 
probability of emergency communication demand source well amplifies the effect of 
retrial on the renewal demand. 
In cases when the majority of blocked calls reenter a system as retrial attempts, 
other statistics, such as the number of retrial attempts and time required for blocked calls 
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to connect successfully to the system, also provide meaningful indicators of system 
performance.  
 
Figure 3-5: Average Retrial Attempts of Blocked Calls due to Renewal and Poisson 
Seismic Communication Demand models 
 
Figure 3-5 presents the plot of average retrial attempts of blocked calls for a 
typical Shelby County central office which is subjected to renewal communication 
demand and traditional Poisson process demand against seismic intensity. The plot shows 
the increase of the retrial attempts due to the increase in the original demand in PGA. The 
higher original demand in terms of PGA in the Poisson and renewal processes results in 
higher blocking probabilities for both first attempts and retrial attempts. This causes a 
blocked call to require more than one reattempt to successfully connect to the central 
office and also results in longer delays per call, as shown later in Figure 3-7 and Figure 
3-8, even though the retrial characteristics are independent of PGA. 
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Figure 3-5 also shows significant differences in average retrial attempts at the 
central office subjected to renewal demand and traditional Poisson demand. More retrial 
attempts in the renewal demand are expected because the blocking probabilities of the 
renewal demand are higher, as shown in Figure 3-4. The plot shows the numbers of 
retrial attempts of the renewal demand are much greater than those of the traditional 
Poisson demand at high PGA, even though the differences between blocking probabilities 
of the two demand models are less at high PGA, especially higher than 0.05g. This is a 
result of the higher retrial probability and shorter interarrival retrial time of demand 
source 2. The average retrial attempts of the renewal demand can become almost twice 
the average retrial attempts of the Poisson demand. This suggests a high sensitivity of the 
central office performance to retrial behavior which agrees with the conclusion from the 
study of Jrad et al. (2007). 
For the renewal demand, the plot of average retrial attempts clearly shows the 
different responses of the central office in the ground shaking perception range and the 
physical damage range. The rate of increase in the number of retrials over PGA is the 
highest in the overlap range (between 0.015g and 0.05g), while the high rate is still 
present at higher PGA due to the retrial behavior of the demand source 2. To better 
understand the effects of retrial behavior, the plot of average retrial attempts of each 
demand source is presented in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6: Average Retrial Attempts of Blocked Calls due to Renewal Seismic 
Communication Demand Displayed by Source Type 
 
Figure 3-6 reveals that retrial behavior affects the average retrial attempts per call. 
While the average retrial attempts of demand source 1 and 3 are close since their retrial 
behaviors are identical, the average retrial attempts of demand source 2 are significantly 
higher due to shorter interarrival retrial times. It can also be seen that the average of 
retrial attempts of demand sources 1 and 3 are close to those of the Poisson demand 
(Figure 3-5) which shares the same retrial behavior. This suggests that the characteristic 
of the first attempts of sources 1 and 3 have only slight effects on average retrial attempts 
per call. The higher first attempt demand magnitude results in slightly more average 
retrial attempt per call. From the plot of average retrial attempt by renewal demand 
sources, it is quite clear that the retrial behavior of the demand source 2 causes the 
significant difference between the renewal and Poisson demands. 
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Figure 3-7: Average Delay per Blocked Call due to Seismic Communication Demand 
 
Figure 3-7 presents the plot of average delay per blocked call of the renewal and 
the Poisson demand. Note that the delays are defined as time lags between the first 
blocked attempts and the successful attempts of the same calls. For time-sensitive 
communication, such as emergency calls or data transfer in SCADA systems used in 
electric power operation, this statistic is very critical. Long delay could result in 
instability and unreliable operation of power grids or even death in life-threatening 
emergencies. 
The delay only occurs when the central office experiences such high volume of 
calls that some calls are blocked and returned to the system as a retrial. Since the retrial 
behavior has a mean interarrival retrial time of 15 minutes, it can be seen from the plot 
that the average delay is approximately 15 minutes when the average number of retrials is 
approximately one (PGA between 0.01g and 0.015g). Although the mean interarrival 
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retrial time is independent of seismic intensities, the plot shows positive correlation with 
PGA because the high blocking probability of the central office results in the situation 
where retrial calls are also blocked. Several retrial attempts are needed for a call to go 
through the system. This is consistent with Figure 3-5, where longer delays are expected 
when more retrial attempts are required.  
Figure 3-7 shows a lower rate of increase in delay versus PGA than the rate of 
increase in the number of average retrial attempts shown in Figure 3-5. This is a result of 
the shorter interarrival retrial of demand source 2 (5 minutes). Even though more retrial 
attempts are required, they come back to the system with much higher rate. Hence, 
demand source 2 a has better chance to successfully connect to the system in a shorter 
time. This conclusion is supported by the plot of average delay of each demand source in 
Figure 3-8. It can be seen that the delay of demand source 2 is comparably shorter than 
those of demand source 1 and even of demand source 3 at low seismic intensities. 
Moreover, Figure 3-8 also shows the rates of increase in average delay of each demand 




Figure 3-8: Average Delay per Blocked Call due to Renewal Seismic Communication 
Demand Displayed by Sources 
 
The plot in Figure 3-8 is also useful in explaining the degradation of the system in 
delay for dial tone. Demand source 2 is the communication demand due to the needs of 
emergency service and it is considered more critical and more time-sensitive than 
demand sources 1 and 3. The consequence of the same delay in source 2 is definitely 
worse than in source 1 or 3. For example, at PGA of 0.05g, the average delay for source 1 
is approximate 24 minutes while the delay is approximate 20 minutes for source 2.  
Although the delay for source 2 is shorter, a 20-minute delay in requesting emergency 
service is not acceptable and could result in fatalities while a 24-minute delay in source 1 
might just raise more concern by the subscribers who make phone calls. Therefore, it is 
critical to obtain the information shown in Figure 3-8 by source type in order to assess the 
consequence of the degradation of the telecommunication system.    
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As also seen on the previous plots, the noticeable transition in the response due to 
the distinguishing of communication sources also appears in Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8. 
The expected delay of central office is the most sensitive to seismic intensity in the 
overlap range between the ground shaking perception and seismic-induced physical 
damage ranges (Sources 1 and 2). The average delay of the renewal demand is also 
longer than the Poisson demand. The overall performance of this central office subjected 
to the renewal demand is worse than the same central office subjected to the traditional 
Poisson demand. 
Besides the blocking probability, the number of retrial attempts, and the delay of 
blocked calls, server status is another statistic that can provide insight into the behavior of 
a central office. The server status of a central office is the variation in the number of calls 
in the telephone switch or server in time. Normally, a server status is shown as a plot of 
the number of calls in the server versus time of day. In a normal day situation, a server 
status varies throughout the day due to activities of subscribers. However, the server 
status developed in this study focuses on the transient state excited by seismic events. 
Therefore, the time scale of server status in this study represents time lags after the initial 
shock of an earthquake. The variation in the server status before the earthquake is 
assumed to be very small compared to the abnormally high load from the earthquake.  
Hence, the effects of small variation in the status of the servers during the normal 






 PGA = 0.010g PGA = 0.014g PGA = 0.018g 





 PGA = 0.022g PGA = 0.053g PGA = 0.260g 
 (d) (e) (f) 
 
Figure 3-9: Server Status of a Central Office Subjected to Poisson Demand by Attempts  
 
Figure 3-9(a) through (f) show the traffic profiles of a central office subjected to 
the traditional Poisson demand corresponding to PGA levels of 0.010g, 0.014g, 0.018g, 
0.022g, 0.053g, and 0.260g, respectively. These PGA levels are the seismic intensities in 
which the renewal demand significantly changes. These server statuses are compared to 
the statuses of the central office subjected to the renewal demands. 
The server status in Figure 3-9 shows variation of total, first, and retrial call 






















plots share similar characteristic. Each of them can be distinguished in three main periods 
of time.  
The first period is the period when the calls start entering the server and reach the 
capacity of the server. This period involves only first call attempt since no calls are 
blocked yet, so there are no retrial attempts register to the system. The profiles show that 
this period become shorter when arrival rates of calls become higher at higher PGA 
levels.  
The second period is when the server is congested due to overloading. The server 
starts rejecting the request for service because the capacity has been reached. Some of the 
blocked calls start coming back to the server as retrial attempts shortly after and amplify 
the overloading. The plots show the rise in the number of retrial attempts entering the 
server, while the amount of first attempts drop. At low arrival rate and seismic intensity, 
this congestion period ends once first attempts stop. In this example, the first attempts are 
made to the server for 60 minutes after the initial shock. Thus, this period ends at 60 
minutes in Figure 3-9(a) through (d). However, this is not true at higher arrival rate and 
PGA when more first attempts are blocked and even more retrial attempts try to come 
back to the server. This results in the extension of the congestion period because the 
server is still stressed by large amount of retrial attempts even if first attempts stop 
entering the server. Figure 3-9(e) and (f) show the sudden drop of first attempts in the 
server and the sudden rise of retrial attempts at 60 minute when the first attempts stop 
entering the server. It can be seen that retrial attempts successfully connect to the server 
at much higher rate once first attempts stop entering the server. Figure 3-9(f) shows the 
congestion period can be extended up to almost 100 minutes after the initial shock.  
Finally, the last period represents the relaxation of the server. This period shows 
the gradual decrease in the number of calls to the server as they leave the server after the 
termination of the call. In this period, the server recovers from congestion and it is 
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Figure 3-10: Server Status of a Central Office Subjected to Renewal Demand by 
Attempts 
 
Figure 3-10 shows the server status plots for the renewal demand. The three 
characteristic periods shown in the plots of the Poisson demand in Figure 3-9 also appear 
in the plots of the renewal demand. However, the variation of first and retrial attempts 
between the two demand models is clearly different since the renewal demand model 
consists of three sources which are introduced to the central office at different times—






















first 15 minutes after the initial shock, and Source 3 is active 30 minutes after the first 
shock for 60 minutes. 
The server statuses in Figure 3-10 are presented only to illustrate the different 
variations in time between the Poisson (Figure 3-9) and the renewal demands. To provide 
additional insights, the server status of the renewal demand displayed by sources is 
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Figure 3-11(a) is the server status of the central office subjected to renewal 
seismic communication demand of 0.010g PGA. At this seismic intensity, only a few 
subscribers in the area feel ground shaking. The offered load is close to the design load of 
the central office. The peak in the profile is just less than the capacity. Only demand 
source 1 and 3 register to the central office as defined earlier in this chapter. Demand 
source 1 dominates the central office while the magnitude of the demand source 3 is the 
normal day operation of long distant calls. 
Figure 3-11(b) is the status of the server when the PGA level is 0.014g. The 
offered load of demand source 1 is about 1.2 times the load a a 0.010g PGA, while there 
are no changes to the offered load of demand source 3. Some calls are blocked and return 
to the system as retrial attempts as shown in Figure 3-10(b). However, the blocking 
probability of this profile is still low (1.8% blocking, shown in Figure 3-4). 
In Figure 3-11(c) (PGA = 0.018g), the demand source 2 appear in the profile with 
small magnitude since only few damages to structural are presented and few emergency 
services are required. It should be noted that the demand source 1 and 2 enter the central 
office at the same time, but the demand source 2 ends earlier. At this seismic intensity, 
demand source 1 still dominates the system since the magnitude of the offered load of 
demand source 2 and 3 are very small compared to demand source 1. 
At a PGA = 0.022g, the magnitude of the demand source 3 increases dramatically 
due to the recognition of the earthquake event by subscribers outside the affected area 
from national media. The profile in Figure 3-11(d) shows a significant drop of the 
demand source 1 when the demand source 3 arrives to the system (30 minutes after the 
initial shock). Shortly after, the system adjusts itself to a stable state  (the state where the 
profile of each source becomes constant) before the demand source 1 ends at 60 minute 
and more demand source 3 continues connecting to the central office. Also note that the 
amount of retrial attempts becomes more significant, as previously shown in Figure 
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3-10(d). The congestion period of the server is extended due to demand source 3 which 
stops registering to the server after 90 minutes. 
At a PGA = 0.053g, the magnitude of the demand source 1 has reached its 
maximum possible load while the magnitude of the demand source 3 remains constant. 
Because arrival rate of demand source 1 increases, Figure 3-11(e) shows the dominance 
of demand source 1 over the period of time. More retrial attempts of demand source 1 are 
collected and come back to the server with higher rate after demand source 3 is cleared 
from the system at 90 minutes after the initial shock. Figure 3-11(e) also shows more 
calls from demand source 2 entering the server due to more physical damage to structures 
and more life threatening emergency situations as expected at a higher PGA. 
Figure 3-11(f) is the server status of the central office subjected to renewal 
seismic communication demand at a PGA of 0.260g. At this seismic intensity, the calls 
from all three demand sources reach their maximum possible magnitudes. Each demand 
source generates calls to the server differently in time. Source 2 dominates the server 
right after the initial shock while demand source 1 starts to occupy most of the system 
after demand source 2 drops from the system after 15 minute. Only retrial attempts of 
demand source 2 come back to the server afterward. Demand source 3 enters the server 
with the lowest rate 30 minutes after the first shock. When first attempts of demand 
sources 1 drop off from the server at 60 minutes after the shock, the calls from demand 
source 3 enter the server at a higher rates as the capacity of the starts to clear up. After 90 
minutes, retrial attempts from each demand sources start to come back with higher rate 
due to the end of first attempts of all demand. It can be seen that the retrial attempts from 
demand source 1 are much more significant because the magnitude of the offered load of 
demand source 1 is the largest. Figure 3-11(f) also shows long congestion period of the 
server and almost instant congestion after the first shock. 
Some critical conclusions can be drawn from the results presented. First, 
recognizing and distinguishing communication sources reveals more clearly the 
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vulnerability of the central office, especially at low seismic intensities, which could result 
in even more vulnerability of an entire system with a low degree of redundancy. Second, 
retrial attempts play a crucial role in performance of the central office and should not be 
neglected in the performance analysis of telecommunication systems. Third, high arrival 
rate of retrial attempts from blocked calls reduces the delay of the calls and increase the 
chance of successfully connecting to the server; however, high arrival rate of retrial 
attempts significantly degrade the performance of the system and affects delays of calls 
from other demand sources. Fourth, a numerical method is necessary to capture the 
combined effects of distinct communication demand sources. Finally, communication 
sources with high magnitude of offered load occupied most of the server capacity and 
influence overall performance of the central office. 
3.4 Summary 
Understanding the effects of seismic hazards on the systems is essential. This 
chapter introduces seismic hazards and the determination of seismic intensity for 
geographically distributed network components at a local site. Earthquake source, ground 
motion attenuation, local soil amplification, and spatial correlation of seismic intensities 
are necessary ingredients for seismic hazard characterization. The two seismic hazard 
analyses—probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and scenario earthquake based seismic 
hazard analysis—are also presented. Common seismic-induced damage to various 
electric power and telecommunication network components are listed, along with the 
probabilistic assessment of their functionality. The failure fragility functions of the 
networks components used to demonstrate the application of the methodology developed 
in this research are also given. 
Besides traditional physical damage due to earthquakes, this chapter introduces 
the concept of traffic theory and proposes the use of renewal process and Weibull 
distribution to model the abnormally high communication demand on telecommunication 
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systems after earthquake events. Recognition and distinction of the communication 
sources of communication demands are important. The results from congestion 
simulation on a network component are presented at the end of the chapter. The 
comparison between the proposed congestion model and the traditional traffic theory 
suggests the underestimation of the traditional Poisson process modeling for low seismic 
hazard level. The contents of this chapter are used again in Chapter 6 as input for the 




CHAPTER 4  
NETWORK MODELS FOR SEISMIC PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
 
Individual infrastructure systems are designed to provide goods and services to 
satisfy public demands. Basic performance assessment of these infrastructures addresses 
the question whether they satisfy the demands. Performance measurement is necessary to 
answer this question. Although modern infrastructures perform well during normal daily 
operation, they occasionally fail to fulfill their tasks during catastrophic events. 
Understanding the causes of failure of these systems is critical to improve their reliability 
and ensure continuous services. Without proper performance evaluation, this goal cannot 
be achieved.   
Since individual infrastructure systems are created for specific purpose, different 
performance measures are used for individual systems. For example, electric power 
systems are designed to distribute electric power from a limited number of generation 
facilities to customers in wide areas, so the amount of power received by customers or the 
number of customers remaining in service is frequently referred to as their performance 
indicator.  Unlike power grids, telecommunication infrastructures are designed to provide 
connections over distance for communication. Instead of the amount of information 
transmitted through the networks and the timely delivery of the information are the major 
concerns, especially in the aftermath of disasters. 
While the previous chapter provides the performance evaluation of network 
components, this chapter focuses on system-level performance. Backgrounds and 
fundamentals of telecommunication and electric power systems are presented, along with 
the introduction of mathematical models which are suitable for seismic performance 
evaluation of individual systems and their interdependent performance.   
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4.1 Telecommunication System 
4.1.1 Fundamentals of Telecommunication Network 
This study considers three types of telecommunication systems—public switched 
telephone network (PSTN), mobile telephone network, and data transmission network. 
The fundamental of the individual systems are discussed as follows. 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
In 1876, the first practical telephone was invented by Alexander Graham Bell. It 
was first used to communicate between two fixed points. However, it was of little use 
without some means of changing connections to other points on an ―as-needed‖ basis. As 
a result, switching offices, called central offices, were established to provide switched 
connections to telephone subscribers within local areas. The central offices directly 
connected to end users via telephone lines or loops, are called end offices. To satisfy 
demands of longer distance connections, end offices were interconnected.  
As networks grew, hierarchical connected networks were preferred to mesh-
connected networks for economic reasons. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 illustrate a 
hierarchical and a mesh-connected network, respectively. As shown, higher-level 
switching offices are needed to connect end offices in hierarchical networks. These 
offices do not connect directly to subscribers. Instead, they provide connections among 
end offices. These connections are referred to as trunks. Although, a hierarchical network 
needs a smaller number of trunks, a mesh-connected network is more reliable due to 




Figure 4-1: Hierarchical Network 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Mesh-Connected Network 
 
PSTNs were initially developed as hierarchical networks. When demands of 
communication between particular switching offices increased, the basic hierarchical 
network trucks were augmented with high-usage trunks as shown in Figure 4-3. High-
usage trunks are used for direct connection between particular switching offices with high 
volumes of traffic. They are likely to connect switching offices of the same hierarchy. In 
the case that these direct trunks are busy or their capacities are exceeded, overflows will 
be alternately routed through the backbone hierarchical network. 
 
First level switch 
Third level switch 





Figure 4-3: Hierarchical Network with High-Usage Trunks 
 
In general, a PSTN can be separated into two main networks, local and toll 
networks. Local networks provide services in small geographic areas such as cities or 
counties, referred to as local access and transport areas (LATAs), while toll networks 
connect local networks together and provide long distance services. Each LATA 
interfaces with a toll network at a single point called a point of presence (POP). End 
offices in a LATA connect to a POP through intermediate offices called access tandems 
or tandem offices (AT&T Bell Laboratories 1983, Noll 1998, Bellamy 2000). A sample 
of this PSTN topology is shown in Figure 4-4. The scope of this research is limited to 
local networks and therefore toll networks will not be discussed further. 
Backbone trunk 
High-usage trunk 
First level switch 
Third level switch 
Second level switch 
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Figure 4-4: Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
 
Mobile Telephone Network  
In 1984, mobile telephone service was introduced in the United States to provide 
telephone service to portable telephone devices. Due to the increasingly affordable prices 
of services and devices, the number of subscribers grew rapidly. As a result, mobile 
telephone networks today are a major part of the PSTN and cannot be ignored.   
Two-way radio transmission is used for mobile-to-mobile communication via cell 
sites or base stations. Physical landlines are used to allow communication between 
mobile telephones and traditional telephones supported on the PSTN. 
In the early days of mobile telephone systems, a single high-power transmitter 
was used to provide services to a large geographic area in an attempt to minimize the 
number of cell sites. However, the capacity of the cell transmitter was limited due to 
restricted radio channels. To solve this problem, low-power transmitters were employed, 
to allow for radio frequency reuse in other nearby geographic areas. As a result, a number 
of cell sites are required each coverage small area. This can become a problem, in 















mounted to existing structures such as building rooftops, power transmission towers, and 
elevated water storage tanks. As a result, the seismic performance of these transmitters 
becomes highly dependent upon the performance of the supporting structure. 
One of the basic features of mobile telephone service which permits true mobility 
for mobile phone users is called handoff. This key feature utilizes dynamic tracking of the 
signal strength from the users so the calls can be continuously handled and transferred 
between cell sites while the users are moving. This greatly increases complexity and 
vulnerability of the service since a call involves a number of network components. 
In modern mobile telephone systems, base stations are known as base transceiver 
stations (BTSs). A number of BTSs are connected to a base station controller (BSC) and 
together form a base station subsystem (BSS), as shown in Figure 4-5. A number of BSSs 
then connect to a tandem office of a PSTN through a gateway mobile switching center 
(GMSC) (Noll 1998). Mobile telephone systems can be considered to operate on top of 
PSTN facilities but in this study, the mobile telephone system and the PSTN will be 
considered together as a single voice telecommunication system. 
 














Data transmission network 
To transmit messages through telecommunication networks, three basic switching 
methods are currently used: circuit, message, and packet. Circuit switching occupies a 
dedicated connection for transmitting information, even though data is not always 
transmitted during the established connection. Because of this, circuit switching is not 
preferred. With message switching, messages are switched and transmitted in their 
entirety over the network. Packet switching divides the message into short bursts of fixed 
lengths, called packets, and switches and transmits them over a number of different paths 
before reaching the destination, where they are reassembled into the original message. 
The messages or packets sent through the network may be stored temporarily for some 
time along its transmission while waiting for the availability of channels (Noll 1998). A 
packet switching algorithm is more suitable for routinely data transmission. Therefore 
packet switching is commonly used by the SCADA system. 
In practice, both dedicated and non-dedicated communication channels are used 
by the SCADA system in electric power system operation (Meliopoulos 2005). There are 
a number of media used for this purpose, from telephone circuits to microwave and fiber 
optic links. For simplicity, all data transmission used by the SCADA system in this 
research is assumed to be carried out over PSTN facilities. Packet-switching equipment is 
collocated at telephone switching offices (i.e., end offices, tandem offices, and POPs). 
Normally, data and voice are transmitted over the same trunks, sharing trunk capacity. 
4.1.2 Telecommunication Network Model  
Network Blocking Probability 
Blocking probabilities of individual trunks and switching equipment have been 
presented in the previous chapter. However, a phone call through a large network 
generally involves a series of trunks and switches, each of which is selected from feasible 
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alternatives. Therefore, the blocking probability of a phone call is the combined blocking 
probability of the necessary facilities along its routes between origin and destination. This 
probability is referred to as end-to-end blocking probability. 
In general, there are a number of routes that connect a set of origins and 
destinations in a complex network. However, not all routes are used in practice. Short 
routes or routes that occupy minimum facilities are preferable, while the longer 
transmission routes usually result in a noisier traveling signal. To maintain quality of 
voice communication, lengthy routes are avoided. To reflect this practice, a set of simple 
routing rules are created to select the most likely routes between a pair of origin and 
destination and used in this research. 
In order to understand the routing rules, two important terms, path length and 
essential office need to be introduced. The path length of a route is the number of links or 
trunks between origin and destination (O-D), while essential offices are offices whose 
deletion completely disconnects routes between a particular O-D set.  
Although sophisticated routing rules are used in real telecommunication systems, 
this study uses the simplest rules that capture traffic to simulate network operation. Since 
quality of service highly depends upon the length of the route, the simplified routing rules 
limit the maximum path length of routes between each pair of essential offices. Figure 
4-6 shows a simplified PSTN to illustrate the essential rules. For example, to establish a 
phone call between two subscribers who connect to end offices a  and b , every possible 
route has to utilize end office a  and b , and also tandem offices c  and d . Since the 
deletion of either one of these tandem offices disconnects end offices a  and b , the four 
offices between a  and b are essential offices of the connection. For the routing rule that 
limits maximum path lengths between essential offices to two, there are two routes 
allowed between essential office a  and c . They are ca  and cfa  . Between 
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essential office c  and d , only routes dc  , dec  , and dhc   are allowed 
and there is only one route bd   available between d  and b .  
  
Figure 4-6: Simplified PSTN 
 
The end-to-end blocking probability of each of the routes between each pair of 
essential offices can then be calculated as the probability of the serial system using, 
 








11  (4-1) 
 
where esP  is end-to-end blocking probability of a serial system, ibP  is the blocking 
probability of trunk or switching office i  existing along the route, and n  is the total 
number of facilities along the route. The final end-to-end blocking probability between 













epP  is the end-to-end blocking probability of a parallel system, ieP  is the end-to-















essential offices. Finally, the end-to-end blocking probability between the origin and 
destination are calculated from the series of pairs of essential offices. In this case, end-to-
end blocking probability between a  and b  is calculated by Equation 4-1 from the end-to-
end blocking probability between office a  and c , c  and d , and d  and b . 
It should be noted that Equation 4-2 is derived from the assumption that the 
probabilities of parallel routes are statistically independent. This is true in large networks, 
whose alternate routes carry traffic from different sources. This assumption is reasonable 
for the size of the studied network. However, in smaller networks, the blocking 
probability of alternate routes tends to increase when main routes are blocked. 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 show the simplified PSTNs used to investigate the 
effects of size, topology, redundancy and routing rules on the end-to-end blocking 
probability calculations. Since the networks represent LATAs, only a single POP is 
present in each of them. The size of a network is determined by the number of end offices 
in such networks. Figure 4-7 shows 5-, 10-, and 20-tandem-office PSTNs with 3 end 
offices attached to each tandem office. Figure 4-8 presents networks with the same sizes 
as the PSTNs in Figure 4-7 with different topology. Different degrees of dependencies 
are investigated for each network size. Zero redundancy means networks are 
hierarchically connected with only backbone trunks while 100% redundancy means 
networks are fully connected in PSTN fashion, which means only fully connected among 
tandem offices and among end offices that share the same tandem offices. Since there are 
a large number of possible networks that have degrees of redundancies between 0% and 




Figure 4-7: Simplified 5-, 10-, and 20-Tandem-Office PSTNs, with 3 End Offices per a 
Tandem Office  
15-End-Office PSTN   
30-End-Office PSTN   
60-End-Office PSTN   
0% Redundancy   100% Redundancy 






Figure 4-8: Simplified 5-Tandem-Office PSTNs, with 3, 6, and 12 End Offices per a 
Tandem Office 
 
Figure 4-9 through Figure 4-12 present the network blocking probabilities of the 
simplified PSTNs shown in Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8.  Each mark represents an average 
end-to-end blocking probability for every pair of an O-D in a PSTN. The plots show 
average end-to-end blocking probabilities versus the degree of redundancy of the 
networks. The network blocking probabilities are calculated using the assumption that all 
components, both switches and trunks, are designed for a maximum blocking probability 
of 0.01 during BSBHs. These calculated network probabilities represent the probabilities 
of the networks operating at design traffic loads.  
The computational process for each point plotted in Figure 4-9 through Figure 
4-12 starts from generating a network by randomly adding high-usage trunks to the 
15-End-Office PSTN   
30-End-Office PSTN   
60-End-Office PSTN   
0% Redundancy   100% Redundancy 




backbone hierarchical network and then determining the redundancy of the network (the 
ratio of the number of high-usage trunks to the maximum possible number of high-usage 
trunks of the network). Next, all valid routes based on a given routing rule are determined 
for each pair of end offices. Then, the end-to-end blocking probability for each pair of 
origins and destinations is calculated using Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2. The average 
end-to-end blocking probability of all possible pairs of end offices is finally determined 
to represent network blocking probability of the network. 
 
Figure 4-9: Average End-to-End Blocking Probability of PSTNs Utilizing 2-Maximum-
Path-Length Routing Rule 
 
Figure 4-9 shows the plot of average end-to-end blocking probability of the 
simplified PSTNs with the routing rule that limits path length between each pair of 
essential offices to two. This plot combines the network blocking probability of all 
PSTNs presented in Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8. The result shows that the higher 
redundant networks have the lower network blocking probabilities which are caused by 
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more available routs from additional high-usage trunks. This trend is obvious for PSTNs 
with low percent redundancy but not for those with high percent redundancy. From the 
plot, the size and topology of the PSTNs have a modest effect on their network blocking 
probabilities. The larger PSTNs or the PSTNs with more end offices have lower network 
blocking probabilities because larger PSTNs have more O-Ds which are directly 
connected, while the more centralized PSTNs or the PSTNs with more tandem offices 
have higher network blocking probabilities because paths of call routing are longer in 
such networks. 
 
Figure 4-10: Average End-to-End Blocking Probability of PSTNs utilizing 3-Maximum-
Path-Length Routing Rule. 
 
Figure 4-10 presents the same plot as Figure 4-9 for the routing rule that allows 
maximum path length between essential offices of up to three. Figure 4-10 also 
demonstrates the same trends of network blocking probability as shown on Figure 4-9, 
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however, with lower network blocking probabilities since the routing rule allows more 
routes for each O-D. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Average End-to-End Blocking Probability of 30-End-Office PSTNs with 5 
Tandem Offices Utilizing 2- and 3-Maximum-Path-Length Routing Rules 
 
 
Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12 present the plots emphasizing the effects of routing 
rules on network blocking probabilities of 30- and 60-end-office PSTNs, respectively. 
The plots show that the network blocking probabilities of low redundant PSTNs are more 
sensitive to routing rules than those of high redundant PSTNs. The plots also suggest that 




Figure 4-12: Average End-to-End Blocking Probability of 60-End-Office PSTNs with 10 
Tandem Offices Utilizing 2- and 3-Maximum-Path-Length Routing Rules 
 
It can be seen that the average end-to-end blocking probability or the network 
blocking probability, is not so sensitive to size and topology of the networks as to percent 
redundancy. Highly redundant PSTNs perform better than low redundant networks for 
any size and topology. The results also indicate some sensitivity of network blocking 
probability to the selection of routing rules in low redundant PSTNs. This information is 
useful for minimizing computational efforts in estimating performance indices of PSTNs. 
For example, either a 2- or 3-maximum-path-length routing rule is used in the analysis of 
a highly redundant PSTN in metropolitan area. The network blocking probability of the 
PSTN is expected to be the same. However, the required computing time of the network 
blocking probability analysis increases exponentially with the number of possible routes 
in the network. Therefore, it is logical to use 2-maximum-path-length routing rule in the 
analysis of the PSTNs to minimize computing time and still obtain acceptable estimation 
of the network blocking probability.  
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4.1.3 Seismic Performance Assessment of Telecommunication Systems 
The seismic performance assessment of telecommunication systems consists of 
two main ingredients, the functionality assessment of network components and the 
interconnection among them. While the first ingredient was presented in the previous 
chapter, the mathematical model representing the second ingredient is discussed earlier in 
this chapter. For a given level of seismic demand, functionalities and blocking 
probabilities of telecommunication network components are estimated using network 
component fragility functions and component blocking probability curves, respectively. 
The performance of a given telecommunication network is then calculated from its 
topology and the estimated component functionality and blocking probability using the 
network blocking probability concept. In this study, network blocking probability is used 
to quantify performance of a telecommunication network. 
Although the network blocking probability can be deterministically obtained for a 
given level of seismic demand, there is some degree of randomness and uncertainties in 
the models. In order to capture the inherent randomness and uncertainties, the seismic 
performance assessment of a telecommunication system is presented in term of fragility 
functions which is consistent with the general seismic functionality assessment of 
network components and other building structures. In this study, the sources of 
uncertainties of the calculated network blocking probability of a deterministic 
telecommunication network under a given seismic demand are due to the randomness of 
component functionality, component blocking probability, and the imperfect model of 
routing strategies. To determine the probability of exceeding a certain level of network 
blocking probability or a damage state, the Monte Carlo Simulation Method is used. A 
fragility function of a telecommunication network is obtained by repeating Monte Carlo 
Simulation for each level of seismic intensity. The comprehensive procedure of the 
fragility analysis is illustrated in Figure 4-13. 
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Figure 4-13: Fragility Analysis of Telecommunication Network 
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The fragility analysis of a telecommunication network consists of three major 
steps; (1) determine component blocking probabilities, (2) determine network blocking 
probabilities, and (3) determine the probability of exceeding a limit state. The first 
requires fragility functions of network components and a component congestion model. 
The second analyzes network topology and component blocking probability to obtain the 
overall network blocking probability. The first and the second steps are repeated for a 
given seismic intensity so that the probability of exceeding a limit state can be calculated 
in the last step. Figure 4-15 shows an example of output from the first two steps in the 
form of histograms of network blocking probabilities for each seismic intensity level. The 
results shown are obtained from the fragility analysis of a simplified 30-end-office 
telecommunication network with 5 tandem offices and 75% redundancy, shown in Figure 
4-14 using the component fragility functions and the component congestion model 
presented in Chapter 3. By performing the final step on the distributions shown in Figure 
4-15, the probability of exceeding each limit state for each seismic intensity level is 
calculated and the fragility surface is plotted in Figure 4-16.  
Although the entire range of network blocking probability limit states can be 
calculated and shown in a fragility surface, it is more practical to consider only a few 
significant limit states in comparative studies because it is difficult to distinguish and 
present the differences between two fragility surfaces. The limit states of 
telecommunication networks are defined by network blocking probability. The limit 
states of telecommunication network considered in this study are similar to limit states of 
other building structures. Four limit states for fragility analysis of telecommunication 
networks are listed in Table 4-1. 
It should be noted that the proposed limit states based on network blocking 
probability are used to represent the average number of retrial attempts required by a 
subscriber to complete a phone call. Other performance indexes such as average or 
maximum delay of a call, or the maximum number of retrial attempts can also be used to 
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define limit states for fragility analyses of telecommunication systems, depending on the 
purpose of the analyses.  
   
 
Figure 4-14: A Simplified 30-End-Office Telecommunication Network with 5 Tandem 





Figure 4-15: Histogram of Network Blocking Probabilities of The Simplified 
Telecommunication Network in Figure 4-14, Subjected to Uniform Seismic Hazard at 
PGA = 0.125g, 0.150g, 0.175g, 0.200g, 0.225g, and 0.250g. 
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Figure 4-16: Seismic Fragility Surface of The Simplified Telecommunication Network 
in Figure 4-14, Subjected to Uniform Seismic Hazard. 
 
 






Slight Congestion 0.50 
Average 2 attempts are required to make a 
successful connection on a telecommunication 
network. 
Moderate Congestion 0.80 
Average 5 attempts are required to make a 
successful connection on a telecommunication 
network. 
Extensive Congestion 0.90 
Average 10 attempts are required to make a 
successful connection on a telecommunication 
network. 
Complete Block 0.99 
Average 100 attempts are required to make a 




Figure 4-17 presents the fragility curves of the simplified telecommunication 
network for the four limit states. Since the distributions in Figure 4-15 are approximately 
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normal or lognormal distributions, the fragility curves which are composite functions of 
those distributions are expected to be either normal or log-normal distributions, following 
the central limit theorem. The results from a K-S test for goodness of fit suggest that both 
normal and lognormal distributions are acceptable models for the fragility curves at a 5% 
significance level; however, a lognormal distribution is a little more suitable for the 
fragility curves. Thus curves are fitted to log-normal cumulative distribution functions 
(CDF) and each of them are represented by two parameters—median and dispersion. The 
parameters of the 4 fragility curves are summarized in Table 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-17: Seismic Fragility Curves of The Simplified Telecommunication Network in 
Figure 4-14, Subjected to Uniform Seismic Hazard. 
  
Table 4-2: Lognormal Seismic Fragility Parameters of The 
simplified Telecommunication Network in Figure 4-14 
Limit State Median (g) Dispersion 
Slight Congestion 0.15 0.19 
Moderate Congestion 0.22 0.15 
Extensive Congestion 0.26 0.13 
Complete Block 0.41 0.15 
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4.2 Electric Power System 
In electric power engineering, electric power systems or power grids are generally 
divided into two subsystems—transmission and distribution systems. Transmission 
systems operate at high voltage in order to efficiently cover large geographical areas, 
while distribution systems operate at lower voltage and cover local customers or end 
users. In addition, their topology and configuration are significantly different. 
Transmission systems are more complex with a mesh-like topology. Distribution systems 
are simpler tree or looped networks. Due to the disparities, the two subsystems are 
generally considered separately. Although both transmission and distribution systems are 
essential to the functionality of power grids, this study focuses only on transmission 
systems because the disruption to power transmission tends to affect larger numbers of 
customers, including telecommunication operators, and could lead to cascading failure. 
In modern society, continuous service of electric power infrastructure is crucial as 
electricity becomes a major source of energy for daily activities. An interruption could 
vastly affect society, economy, finance, and life safety. To prevent such disruptions, 
reliability assessment of electric power systems is essential. The results from t an 
assessment are used in planning, design, and operating the system to minimize the 
possibility of system failure. 
The methodology used by electric power engineers for reliability assessment of 
electric power systems is discussed in the following sections. The discussion also 
includes the proposed modification and simplification of the methodology for seismic 
reliability assessment of the systems. 
4.2.1 Reliability Assessment of Electric Power Systems 
Reliability assessment of electric power systems concerns two issues—system 
adequacy and system security. System adequacy refers to the ability of an electric power 
system to generate and transmit electric power to satisfy demand in steady state, while 
 96 
system security is the ability of the system to maintain system functionality and stability 
after transient due to disturbance (Billinton and Li 1994). Both issues are equally 
important when reliability of the electric power system is of interest. However, the scope 
of this research is limited to the system adequacy. Only basic concepts of system security 
are briefly addressed in terms of observability later in this chapter. 
4.2.2 Electric Power System Adequacy 
In electric power engineering, reliability assessment is generally associated with 
four tasks—(1) determining component outage models, (2) selecting system states and 
calculating their probabilities, (3) evaluating the consequences of selected system states, 
and (4) calculating the risk indices (Li 2005). With slight modification, these tasks are 
adopted in this research for seismic performance assessment of electric power systems in 
an attempt to bridge the gap between electric power engineering and lifeline earthquake 
engineering.  
The proposed tasks for seismic performance assessment of electric power systems 
are (1) determining component seismic fragility functions, (2) determining probabilistic 
models of seismic hazards affecting the systems, (3) determining disrupted topologies of 
the systems affected by seismic hazards, (4) evaluating performance of the disrupted 
systems, and (5) calculating probabilistic of exceeding limit states and determine fragility 
function. Table 4-3 presents the mapping between the tasks for electric power 
engineering reliability assessment and those for seismic performance assessment. The 
mapping clearly shows that the fundamentals remain the same. The modification only 
introduces seismic hazards into the procedure and presents results in the forms of seismic 
fragility function. 
It can be seen that the seismic performance assessment of electric power systems 
and telecommunication systems follow the same outlines. The only major difference is 
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the performance evaluation of the targeted systems. A more detailed discussion about the 
performance evaluation of electric power system is presented in the following section.    
 
Table 4-3: Mapping between Tasks for Seismic Performance Assessment and Reliability 
Assessment of Electric Power Systems 
Seismic Performance Assessment  Reliability Assessment 
(1) Determining Component Seismic 
Fragility Functions 
(1) Determining Component Outage 
Models. 
(2) Determining Probabilities of Seismic 
Hazard Affecting The Systems (2) Selecting System States and 
Calculating Their Probabilities. (3) Determining Disrupted Topologies of 
The Systems Affected by Seismic Hazard  
(4) Evaluating Performance of the Disrupted 
Systems. 
(3) Evaluating The Consequences of 
Selected System States. 
(5) Calculating Probability of Exceeding 
Limit States and Fragility Functions of 
The Systems 
(4) Calculating The Risk Indices. 
 
Adequacy Evaluation of Electric Power Systems 
In electrical engineering practice, optimal power flow analysis is generally used 
for adequacy evaluation of electric power systems. However, such an analysis is not 
practical in the lifeline earthquake engineering community because a detailed 
specification of the targeted networks is required, but this information is not publically 
available. This results in overly simplified methods which evaluate only performance of 
network components, and generally neglect system topology component and interaction. 
In an attempt to better estimate performance of electric power system in seismic 
performance assessment, Dueñas-Osorio (2005) and Adachi (2007) employ the concepts 
of graph theory to capture topology of the network and simulate the interaction among 
network components. Dueñas-Osorio (2005) also proposed the used of basic network 
optimization analysis in seismic fragility analysis of electric power and water distribution 
systems. In this section, the optimal power flow analysis from electrical engineering is 
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discussed along with its application on seismic performance assessment of electric power 
systems. 
Optimal Power Flow Analysis 
 Billinton and Li (1994) define optimal power flow as finding a solution of power 
system operation and system states, including control variables and state variables, to 
optimize a given objective and to satisfy power flow equations and security constraints. 
Depending on the objective of the optimization, optimal power flow can be used for 
different purposes. The objective of optimal power flow analysis for reliability 
assessment can be minimizing load curtailment or minimizing cost of remedial action 
used to collect abnormal operating conditions (Li 2005, Yang et al. 2007). The optimal 
power flow can be formulated as follows: 
 
Min:         
Subject to:           (4-3) 
                  (4-4) 
 
where        is an objective function of state variables,  , and control variables,  , 
       is a function representing summation of power flow at nodes, and        is 
security constraint functions.  
Generally, optimal power flow analysis is a nonlinear optimization problem since 
the power flow equations include of trigonometric terms. As a result, optimal power flow 
analysis is complex and requires extensive computational effort. Since optimal power 
flow analysis must repeatedly be performed in a reliability assessment of an electric 
power system, there have been many attempts to simplify the power flow equations to 
improve the efficiency of the analysis and maintain the accuracy of the solutions. One of 
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the recent attempts is quadratic power flow model (Kang and Meliopoulos 2002, 
Meliopoulos 2005, Yang et al. 2006, Tao and Meliopoulos 2011). 
Quadratic power flow models utilizes the Kirchhoff’s current law to formulate 
power flow equations in term of Cartesian coordinate state variables, while the traditional 
power flow models express power flow equations using power conservation in term of 
polar coordinate state variables. Accordingly, trigonometric terms are absent and the 
power flow equations become linear or quadratic. In addition, the solutions of the 
quadratic power flow model converge faster without compromising accuracy (Power 
Systems Engineering Research Center 2005, Yang et al. 2007).  
Although the computational burden of solving optimal power flow problems is 
reduced by advances in electric power flow modeling, detail specification of targeted 
power grids and a full understanding of electric power engineering are still required. For 
this reason, the traditional optimal power flow analysis is not popular among lifeline 
earthquake engineers. More generalized optimal network flow models that relaxes 
intensive input requirement and maintain acceptable accuracy of the results are preferred. 
Figure 4-18 shows the comparison between real power flows in transmission lines of the 
24-bus IEEE reliability test system (IEEE Reliability Test System Task Force 1979) 
obtained from traditional power flow equations and optimal network flow algorithm.  
The optimal network flow algorithm used in this analysis is formulated as 
follows: 
Min:          
Subject to:            (4-5) 
                  (4-6) 
   
The objective of the optimization is to minimize the summation of the products between 
transmission line distance,  , and square of the real power flow in the transmission lines, 
 .          is functions representing summation of flow at nodes or buses, where   and 
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  are generated power and electric load, respectively.        is security constraint 
functions of the transmission lines and generation units. 
 
Figure 4-18: Real Power Flows in Transmission Lines of The 24-bus IEEE Reliability 
Test System (IEEE Reliability Test System Task Force 1979), Obtained by Traditional 
Power Flow Model and Optimal Network Flow. 
  
The plot shows only some minor variations between the results from the two 
models. For lifeline earthquake engineering purposes, it therefore is reasonable to use 
optimal network flow model in lieu of the traditional electric power flow model to assess 
performance of electric power systems. 
In a recent study, Dueñas-Osorio (2005) employs the concept of graph theory to 
characterize the topology of the network systems to quantify their performance under 
disruptive conditions. One of the most important proposed performance measurements is 
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the Service Flow Reduction, (SFR). This measurement parameter represents the ability of 
any generic transmission-distribution network systems (e.g. electric power grids, oil and 
gas distribution networks, and water distribution networks) to meet the demands of their 
end-users. The SFR obtained by performing optimal network flow analysis is used to 
quantify electric power system adequacy in this study.  
4.2.3 Electric Power System Security 
Electric power system security is highly dependent upon system monitoring and 
control. In order to maintain the stability of a power system, it is critical that the system is 
able to adjust itself to cope with disturbances, such as sudden changes in loads or loss of 
network components. Monitoring is an important function that provides information 
about the system state and detects such disturbances so that the proper control can be 
timely executed in an attempt to adjust and maintain system stability. From experience, 
the security of the power system can only be insured by continuous monitoring and 
control of the system (Meliopoulos 2005). 
A Control Center is referred to as a facility which provides monitoring, control, 
and operation functions to manage an electric power system. Due to the complexity of 
modern power systems, these functions are all computer assisted. A control center 
manages a power system by monitoring and collecting state data from remote facilities in 
order to analysis and estimate the state of the overall system. Once the system state is 
obtained, appropriate commands are sent back to the remote facilities to control and 
operate the system according to the current state. The processes of monitoring and 
analyzing the system state are repeatedly performed in real time to ensure that the 
controls are up-to-date according to the current system state. 
Monitoring and state estimation of a power system are of interest in this research 
because they rely on telecommunication infrastructure to transmit data from remote 
facilities to the control center. This demonstrates the interdependence between electric 
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power control and operation and telecommunication systems. The discussion on the 
interdependencies between the two systems resumes in Chapter 5. 
 To provide additional background on monitoring and state estimation, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and State Estimation and 
Observability are presented in the following sections.  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems 
To maintain stability, power systems should always satisfy two constraints: 
operating constraints and load constraints. Operating constraints include electric 
frequency, voltage, and power magnitude limits. Load constraints refer to the ability of 
generated power to match demands. To ensure that the system always follows these 
requirements, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are employed. 
The SCADA system consists of two subsystems, control and data collection, as 
the name implies. The supervisory control system, located at the control center, displays 
the status of devices that are spatially distributed, and allows remote control of equipment 
such as transformers and circuit breakers at substations, and power generators at 
generation plants. The data acquisition subsystem provides interfaces between the control 
center and local facilities. It collects data monitored by and sent from these facilities over 
communication systems so that the status of the overall system can be analyzed. This 
analysis is called state estimation. Effective control and operation of electric power 
systems require accurate and reliable knowledge of the system state in real time. 
However, in catastrophic events, the communication system that supports SCADA may 
not fully function, and state estimation degrades. In the following section, state 





State Estimation and Observability 
The condition of an electric power system is uniquely defined by a set of variables 
called a state. The state consists of voltage magnitudes and phase angles at all nodes, 
referred to as buses in electric power engineering, except one voltage phase angle, which 
is set to zero as a reference. Therefore, a system with   nodes has      state variables. 
Knowing the state of the system, other quantities of interest such as real power and 
reactive power flow can be determined.  
In practice, the state of the system is estimated at the control center from 
measured data sent from local facilities. The measurements are usually real and reactive 
power flow and voltage magnitudes. In normal operation, there are a number of 
redundant measurements received by the control center. The use of redundant measures 
ensures better quality and reliability of state estimation. However, when communication 
channels are not fully functional, there is a possibility that sufficient measurements will 
not be delivered to the control center. One important question then is whether or not the 
state of the system is still observable. 
Consider a system with   states and  measurements. The general linear model 
of the measurement is 
        (4-7) 
where   is a measurement vector,   is a state vector,   is an    matrix, and   is a 
measurement noise vector. The sufficient conditions to obtain a unique solution for   are 
    and the rank of   is equal to  . Although   is constructed by sophisticated 
system identification procedures (Meliopoulos 2005) and is required to determine 
whether the state of the system is observable, it can be shown that the topology of  , 
which is more easily constructed from the set of measurements and the topology of the 
system, can be used in an equivalent way. The process by which the rank of   is deduced 
from its topology is known as Topological Observability. 
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To determine the Observability of a system by Topological Observability, the 
topology of   is determined using the sets of measurements and states. Then, the 
connectivity matrix of the state network is constructed as    . The system is observable 
if and only if this network is connected, which means there are no isolated components 
and the rank of     is equal to the number of state variables. 
In this study, Observability is considered as a performance measurement. As it 
determines whether systems states can be obtained from topology of the power systems 
and available local measurement, Observability is a performance measurement which 
implies system security. 
In the event of an earthquake, it is very likely that Observability of the entire 
power system is not possible, and the system may be divided into islands to maintain 
serviceability in some portions of the system which are still observable and operable. 
Accordingly, Partial Observability of the system provides a better measurement 
parameter to represent the real performance of the system. 
4.3 Summary 
Chapter 4 provides the fundamental background of telecommunication systems 
and the reliability assessment of electric power systems. The discussions also include the 
mathematical representations which are used by individual systems to evaluate seismic 
performance of the system at the system level.  
This research proposes the application of the network blocking probability to 
evaluate telecommunication system subjected to seismic hazard. The methodology is 
tested on synthesized networks which represent simplified telecommunication systems 
with various sizes and topologies. As expected, the results suggest that 
telecommunication networks with higher degree of redundancy operate at lower blocking 
probabilities. The results also indicate that network blocking probabilities of 
telecommunication networks do not depend on sizes or topologies of the networks. 
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Moreover, the study of the effects of routing strategies used in the evaluation of 
telecommunication systems shows that only network blocking probabilities of the 
systems with low redundancy degree are sensitive to routing strategies. Routing rules that 
allow more routes between any pairs of origin and destination provide lower network 
blocking probabilities in low redundancy systems. At the end of the discussion on 
telecommunication systems, a procedure for creating a system fragility function for the 
telecommunication system is proposed. 
In the second part of this chapter, reliability assessment of electric power systems 
is presented. Optimal power flow analysis and simplified network flow analysis are 
performed on the 24-bus IEEE reliability test system (IEEE Reliability Test System Task 
Force 1979) to quantify adequacy reliability of the system. Although there is some 
variation between the results from the simplified network flow analysis and the 
traditional optimal power flow analysis, it is reasonable to use the network flow analysis 
for the seismic performance analysis when detailed information of the system is 
unavailable or insufficient to perform the traditional optimal power flow analysis. 
Besides application for individual evaluation of the system performance, the 
approaches presented in this chapter can also be used to evaluate interdependent 
telecommunication and power systems. The applications of the approaches to 
interdependent systems will be demonstrated later in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5  
INTERDEPENDENCIES OF TELECOMMUNICATION AND 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 
 
Electric power transmission and telecommunication infrastructures are rapidly 
developed in response to the growth of demand in the modern world. Advanced 
technologies developed by each of the systems are exchanged and adopted by one 
another in order to improve services. They greatly benefit from each other in many ways. 
For example, telecommunication systems develop advanced switching equipment which 
relies increasingly on electric power, while electric power systems adopt 
telecommunication technology to collect real-time data from remote facilities for use in 
real-time operation of power grids. Such operation is engineered to provide timely 
adjustment of the power system configuration required to maintain stability of power 
grids during a disruption. This results in unavoidable interdependencies between the two 
systems. Although both systems benefit from the coupling, the interdependencies 
increase the vulnerability of the systems under disruptive conditions.  
Electric power grids and telecommunication systems are related indirectly as well. 
For example, electric power grids are extensively dependent on monitored data 
transmitted over telecommunication network between control center and local facilities. 
Electric power customers rely on telecommunication network to notify problems with 
service in their area in case of blackout. In this chapter, the two critical interdependencies 
are discussed – electric power dependency of telecommunication system operations 
(Physical interdependency) and telecommunication dependency of power system 
operations (Cyber interdependency). 
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5.1 Telecommunication System Dependency on Electric Power System Operations 
Interdependencies among infrastructure systems has been recognized and 
categorized by a few studies (Nojima and Kameda 1991, Rinaldi et al. 2001) which were 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2. The interdependency discussed in this section is classified 
in Functional disaster propagation (Category A) according to Nojima and Kameda (1991) 
or in Physical interdependency (Class 1) according to Rinaldi et al. (2001). This is 
because most equipment used in modern telecommunication infrastructure depends on 
electricity to operate. Even though there are some types of backup power systems for this 
equipment (i.e. backup generator and battery), these backup systems are designed only 
for a few hours of outage of commercial power and they often failed during catastrophic 
earthquakes. 
Physical interdependency is mostly found between transmission-distribution (T-
D) infrastructure systems when one system provides the lifeline for the other system, in 
this case, the electric power system is the provider for the telecommunication system. 
This type of interdependency is among the few interdependencies which have been 
studied within the last decades. Since physical interdependencies are straightforward, 
they are often visualized and formulated as physical links between two components of 
two different systems, i.e. electric power distribution substations in an electric power 
system and central offices in a telecommunication system. 
There are three important components which are involved in simulating the 
physical interdependency between any two infrastructure systems in seismic fragility 
analysis. They are interdependent adjacency, interdependent probabilistic formulation, 
and coupling strength. Each is individually discussed in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Interdependent Adjacency 
Interdependent adjacency establishes physical links between network 
interdependent systems at the component level. These links represent the relationships 
 108 
between components. In the case of electric power and telecommunication systems, a link 
implies that functionality of a telecommunication central office is dependent upon 
electric power sent from the corresponding electric power substation. It must be noted 
that, in this case, the link only indicates a unidirectional relationship since the 
functionality of the electric power substation does not depend upon the corresponding 
central office in particular. The inverse relationship of the two systems 
(telecommunication dependency of power system operations) is discussed later in this 
chapter.   
The interdependent adjacency matrix,   , of the interdependent electric power 
and telecommunication systems is an                 matrix, where        and 
         are the sizes of electric power system and telecommunication system, 
respectively. The interdependent adjacency matrix is defined by: 
 
        
  
 
                                                  
                                                                                 
  (5-1)  
 
5.1.2 Probabilistic Formulation of Physical Interdependency 
While the previous chapter presents independent fragility functions for network 
components, this section discusses the interdependent fragility functions for network 
components. It is logical to formulate physical interdependency from the component level 
because the relationships between the interdependent systems arise from their 
components.  
When interdependency is the concern, the failure probability of a network 
component must be determined not only from the failure due to the main cause (seismic 
hazard in this case), but also from the failure due to interdependent relationships. 
Therefore, the power dependent failure probability of a telecommunication central office 
is defined by: 
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                            (5-2)  
 
where        is the event that the telecommunication central office interdependently fails, 
and it is the union of the event that the central office fails due to earthquake,     , and 
the event that it fails as a result from the failure of power substation,         . Since      
and          are not mutually exclusive, the formula can be written as: 
 
                                                (5-3) 
 
From the assumption that the two event,      and         , are also statistically 
independent, the joint probability is equal to the product of the two probabilities and the 
interdependent failure probability is: 
 
                                                    (5-4) 
 
In Equation (5-4),         can be obtained from the independent fragility functions 
presented in the earlier chapter and the             can be derived using the concept of 
conditional probability. Since          occurs only when the corresponding power 
substation fails due to an earthquake,     , the conditional probability is obtained: 
 
                  
               
       
 (5-5) 
 
However, since      is the sample space of          , the intersection of the two events 
is equal to          or : 
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                                      (5-6) 
 
By substituting Equation (5-6) into Equation (5-4), the power dependent failure 
probability of the telecommunication is finally formulated as: 
 
                                            
                                   (5-7) 
 
From Equation (5-7),         is obtained from the system analysis of the independent 
fragility function of the electric power substation, and                  represents 
Coupling Strength of the interdependencies between the two components which is 
discussed in the following section. 
 Once the interdependent probability           is determined for each component 
of telecommunication systems, the congestion model is considered for each surviving 
components (blocking probability of 1 is assigned for failure components), and the 
process is repeated for the entire range of seismic intensities. The fragility function is 
then obtained and used in the power dependent fragility analysis of telecommunication 
systems.  
5.1.3 Coupling Strength  
 Coupling strength, Sc, represents magnitude of interdependency between two 
network components. It is defined as a conditional probability as described in the 
previous section. In this case, coupling strength is the conditional probability of an event 
that a telecommunication component fails as a result of failure of the corresponding 
power substation. 
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Since coupling strength is a probability, it ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means that 
the component are independent and 1 means that the component is fully dependent on the 
component of the other system. In the study of the interdependent telecommunication and 
electric power systems, coupling strength can be seen as a reliability index of the backup 
system of a telecommunication component, where low coupling strength implies that the 
backup system is reliable while high coupling strength indicates an unreliable backup 
system. 
The coupling strength between a telecommunication central office and an electric 
power substation may be quantified by analyzing their outage records.  From Equation 5-
7, a coupling strength is a conditional probability of central office failure given that the 
corresponding substation fails, so the coupling strength can be estimated as a ratio of the 
number of outages of the central office due to substation outage to the total number of 
substation outages in a given time. These numbers may be obtained from typical outage 
records of the facilities. 
Since a coupling strength can be considered as a reliability index of the power 
backup system used by the central office, another way of determining a coupling strength 
is to perform seismic performance analysis of the backup system. The probability that 
central office fails due to the failure of the corresponding electric substation             
may also be written as: 
 
                           (5-8) 
 
where      is the event that the power backup system fails due to earthquakes and      
is the event that the corresponding electric power substation fails due to earthquakes (also 
defined above). Because these two events are statistically independent, Equation 5-8 can 
be rewritten as: 
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                             (5-9) 
 
By substituting Equation 5-9 into Equation 5-6, the coupling strength                   
is equal to        . Therefore, coupling strength can also be quantified by determining 
seismic performance of power backup systems used in central offices. 
Quantifying coupling strength between network components is one of the most 
important tasks in the study of infrastructure interdependencies. However, this task is 
beyond the scope of this study. Only sensitivity analysis of seismic performance of the 
interdependent systems is performed. The results of the analysis are presented in the next 
chapter. 
5.2 Electric Power System Dependency on Telecommunication Systems Operations 
  This research proposes a framework for studying the interdependency between 
the electric power and telecommunication infrastructure systems under seismic 
conditions. The primary interdependency is due to cyber dependency, and it is developed 
through electric power system control and operations which extensively utilize SCADA 
systems for monitoring and managing geographically distributed facilities. As one of the 
most vital elements of SCADA systems, failure of the telecommunication infrastructure 
impacts reliability and stability of electric power grids. 
Cyber interdependency is considered as one of the most critical threats to modern 
infrastructure systems as a result of the rapid development of information technology and 
the telecommunication infrastructure. Despite the fact that reliability of 
telecommunication infrastructures in normal operation has greatly improved in recent 
years, the systems are seldom designed to withstand extreme conditions such as natural 
disasters (i.e. earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados) or terrorist attacks. Disruptions to 
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telecommunication systems in such events affect the performance of other infrastructure 
systems while they are most needed for recovery from the catastrophic events. 
The following sections present the treatment of the cyber interdependency 
between electric power and telecommunication systems subjected to seismic hazard. The 
proposed framework is developed based on high-level assumptions and the basic 
concepts of observability. 
5.2.1 Cyber Interdependency Analysis 
Unlike physical interdependency, the effects of cyber interdependency on the 
target infrastructure systems are not straightforward. Although interdependent adjacency 
can sometimes be established at component levels, the impacts of the interdependency 
are seldom localized. However, the same two-step approach used in developing the 
model for physical interdependency is also valid for cyber interdependency. First the 
relationship must be defined and then the consequences are determined. 
In the case of telecommunication and electric power systems, one of the 
relationships between them is through the use of the SCADA systems in electric power 
controls and operations. Monitored measurements at local facilities are transmitted over 
the telecommunication infrastructure to the control center or, in other words, between two 
central offices in the telecommunication systems. Therefore, the relationship between the 
two systems can be simply defined at the component level between local electric power 
substations and the control center, and telecommunication end offices. 
Telecommunication infrastructures provide connections between remote facilities 
and the control center of power grids. Failure of telecommunication systems implies loss 
of connections between them. Since the local measurements are essential to the 
estimation of the power system states in order to maintain system stability, the quality of 
the state estimation and stability of the power grid can be compromised if measurements 
are not delivered on timely basis. Unlike the case of physical interdependency, failure of 
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a telecommunication end office serving a power substation does not directly affect the 
functionality of the particular substation; instead, it influences the stability of the entire 
electric power system. In order to capture the impacts of lose of measurements in electric 
power state estimation, the concepts of topology observability and partial observability 
are employed. 
5.2.2 Observability 
The objective of the observability analysis is to determine whether state 
estimation analysis of the target electric power system can be performed from the set of 
available measurements. Justification is made by the calculation of the rank of the   
matrix from the set of the linear power flow model (Equation 4-7). The system is 
observable only if the rank of   is equal to the number of state variables (     state 
variables for  -bus power systems).  
There are a number of studies utilizing the concept of graph theory to formulate 
observability analysis. By constructing two graphs, one for physical topology and the 
other for measurement topology of a electric power system, observability of the system 
can be evaluated by determining a minimum spanning tree (Mori and Tsuzuki 1991). The 
existence of the minimum spanning tree in the two graphs is equivalent to the necessary 
condition required for an observable system (Krumpholz et al. 1980, Monticelli and Wu 
1985a, Jain et al. 2005).  
The topological analysis using graph theory concepts also allows the 
determination of observable subnetworks.  This graph theory based algorithm is very 
useful for this research because observability of the entire electric power system is highly 
unlikely under seismic conditions. It is logical to determine the largest portion of the 
system in order to minimize the loss when the stability of the entire system is not 
possible. 
 115 
This study adopts the concept of partial observability as an indicator to illustrate 
another aspect of the interdependency between telecommunication and electric power 
systems besides physical interdependency. It should be noted that observability does not 
imply operability or stability of electric power systems but it is essential in system 
operation.  However, it is a good performance measurement indicating whether the 
attempt to maintain stability of the system is still possible during disastrous events. 
5.3 Summary 
Telecommunication and electric power systems are infrastructure systems which 
are highly interdependent. The two aspects of the interdependencies between the two 
systems are power dependency of telecommunication (physical interdependency) and 
telecommunication dependency of electric power system operations (cyber 
interdependency). The physical interdependency is directly established from three 
important components: (1) interdependent adjacency – the representation of the physical 
links between components of the two systems, (2) probabilistic formula – the 
probabilistic relationship defining effects of the interdependency at the component level, 
and (3) coupling strength – the conditional probability which quantifies intensity of the 
interdependency. The cyber interdependency between electric power grid and 
telecommunication system arises through the SCADA systems used in electric power 
system operations. SCADA depends on telecommunication system to provide the 
necessary communication between remote facilities and the electric power control center. 
Unavailable communication channels during disasters can compromise the ability of an 
electric power system to maintain its stability. This research adopts the concepts of state 
estimation and observability to illustrate cyber interdependency of electric power 
systems. Observability is proposed to be used as a performance index in this work. The 
proposed model defines a relationship between electric power substations and control 
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center, and telecommunication end offices. The following chapter presents and discusses 
the applications of the proposed models on the test base systems in Shelby County, TN.  
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CHAPTER 6  
NETWORK RESPONSE TO SEISMIC DISRUPTION AND 
MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
 
Shelby County, TN is located approximately 60 miles to the south of the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). It has been selected by the Mid America Earthquake 
Center (MAEC) as a study region for integrated seismic loss assessment and 
consequence-based earthquake risk management because of its population density, 
buildings and infrastructure inventory, and location (MAEC 2006). Several studies on the 
interdependencies of the electric power and water systems (Dueñas-Osorio 2005, 
Leelardcharoen 2005, Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2006, Adachi 2007, Duenas-Osorio et al. 
2007a, Duenas-Osorio et al. 2007b, Kim et al. 2007, Adachi and Ellingwood 2008, 
2009b) have been done using this testbed. 
In this chapter, a new study on the interdependencies between the electric power 
and telecommunication systems in the region is presented in order to demonstrate the 
application of the proposed methodology. The chapter briefly introduces the electric 
power and telecommunication system in the Shelby County testbed. Next, the responses 
of the two interdependencies – the electric power dependency of the telecommunication 
system and the telecommunication dependency on the electric power system operations – 
are presented along with sensitivities of the interdependent responses. The chapter 
concludes with studies of seismic mitigation strategies for the coupled infrastructures.    
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6.1 Shelby County Testbed 
6.1.1 Electric Power System  
Figure 6-1 shows the simplified electric power transmission system in Shelby 
County, TN (Shinozuka et al. 1998, Dueñas-Osorio 2005, Leelardcharoen 2005, Adachi 
2007) used in this chapter. The system comprises 45 nodes (buses), including 3 gate 
stations (generation nodes), 5 medium voltage substations (intermediate nodes), and 37 
distribution circuits (end nodes). The nodes are interconnected by 139 transmission lines. 
The fragility functions of the network components are defined in Table 4-1. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Electric Power System in Shelby County, TN 
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6.1.2 Telecommunication System 
The backbone heirarchical telecommunication network in Shelby County, TN is 
shown in Figure 6-2 (high-usage trunks are not shown for clarity). This network is 
synthesized from the locations of central offices in the county available in an online 
central office lookup tool (Marigold Technologies 2007). The system represents a local 
access and transport area (LATA) with  a point of presence (POP), 4 tandem offices, and 
34 end offices (39 central offices in total). The system has 168 trunks (38 backbone 
trunks and 130 high-usage trunks) and 77.4% redundancy. The log-normal fragility 
functions for the telecommunication system components are listed in Table 3-2. 
 
Figure 6-2: Backbone Hierarchical Telecommunication Systems in Shelby County, TN  
 
6.2 Electric Power Dependent Responses of Telecommunication System 
This section presents the physical interdependent responses of the electric power 
and the telecommunication systems in the Shelby County testbed. In this case, the 
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functionality of the telecommunication network components is dependent on electric 
power sent from local electric power substations at deterministic coupling strengths and 
locations. The interdependent adjacency and the coupling strengths are defined in the 
following subsection before the presentation of the interdependent response of the 
system.    
6.2.1 Interdependent Adjacency and Coupling Strength of Electric Power and 
Telecommunication System in Shelby County, TN 
The relationship between telecommunication central offices and electric power 
substations is established from the fact that central offices run on electric power. In 
practice, a power substation provides electricity within a well-defined local area or a 
service area. Therefore, it is logical to assume physical interdependencies between an 
electric power substation and a central office located in its service area (Figure 6-3).  
A coupling strength between interdependent network components is unique for 
each pair of interdependent adjacent components. It is likely that the more critical 
facilities are equipped with more reliable backup power systems. For example, a coupling 
strength for a POP is less than one for a tandem office while the coupling strength for a 
tandem office is less than one for an end office. This study uses the assumption that the 
coupling strength for a POP to an electric power substation is 0.25 less than the one for a 
tandem office and the one for tandem office is 0.25 less than the one for an end office. It 
should always be noted that coupling strengths are probabilities and must be greater than 
0 but less than 1.  
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Figure 6-3: Shelby County Telecommunication Central Offices in Electric Power 
Service Areas 
 
6.2.2 Electric Power Dependent Fragility of Telecommunication System 
In this section, electric power dependent responses of the telecommunication 
system in Shelby County, TN subjected to a uniform seismic hazard are presented. The 
probabilistic responses of the system are illustrated in terms of log-normal fragility 
functions obtained from numerical simulations. The results include fragility curves for 
the interdependent systems with various assumed coupling strengths between network 




Figure 6-4: Independent Fragility Curves of Shelby County Telecommunication System 
for Four Limit States 
 
 
Figure 6-4 shows the fragility curves of the independent system (Coupling 
Strength = 0.0). The four curves represent the four limit states defined earlier in Chapter 
4 (Table 4-1). In this example, 300 simulations are performed at each PGA in order to 
obtain the probability of exceeding the limit states. The plot data are fitted to log-normal 
distributions with acceptable fitness confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test 
for goodness of fit (Ang and Tang 2007). 
The fragility curves indicate that, at 0.25g PGA, there is a 35% probability that 
the telecommunication system blocking probability will exceed 90% (extensive limit 
state), and a 90 % probability that the system blocking probability will exceed 80% 
(moderate limit state). The plot also indicates that there is a 40% probability that the 
system will be completely blocked at over 0.4g PGA. 
It should be noted that the telecommunication fragility medians used this study 
range from 0.26g to 0.40g and the dispersions range from 0.50 to 0.60 (Table 3-2). While 
the system fragilities have similar ranges of medians, the fragility dispersions of the 
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system are significantly less (0.17 to 0.24). The drop of the dispersion is due to the 
interconnection among network components (the combination of parallel and serial 
systems). This result is consistent with the previous studies of infrastructure system 
fragility (Dueñas-Osorio 2005, Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2006, Kim et al. 2007, 
Leelardcharoen et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 6-5: Interdependent Fragility Curves of Shelby County Telecommunication 




Figure 6-5 and Figure 6-6 present plots of the interdependent fragility curves of 
the electric power dependent telecommunication systems with medium coupling strength 
(0.25 for POP, 0.50 for tandem offices, and 0.75 for end offices) and extremely high 
coupling strength (1.0 for all central offices), respectively. It can be seen that 
interdependent systems are more vulnerable to a seismic hazard than the independent 
systems (Figure 6-4) because the curves shift to the left. At the 0.25g PGA, the 
probability of exceeding the extensive congestion limit state (90% blocking probability) 
becomes 100% (for both Figure 6-5 and Figure 6-6) instead of 35% observed earlier in 
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the independent system with the same configuration (Figure 6-4). The plots also show 
that the interdependent telecommunication system reaches severe limit states at lower 
seismic intensities. For example, compared to the independent system, the interdependent 
system (with medium and high coupling strength) reach the 40% probability of exceeding 
limit state of complete block (99% blocking probability) at 0.25g and 0.19g instead of 
0.4g. These results support the statement that the interdependencies cannot be ignored in 
seismic assessment analysis of infrastructure systems. 
 
Figure 6-6: Interdependent Fragility Curves of Shelby County Telecommunication 
System with Coupling Strength = 1.0 for All Central Offices. 
 
 
To enhance the understanding of the influence of the interdependencies on 
seismic responses of the two systems, the sensitivity of the seismic fragility parameters 
are presented in Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8. 
From Figure 6-7, the relationship between the fragility medians and the coupling 
strengths is almost linear. As expected, the medians decreases as the coupling strengths 
increase. The plot suggests that the medians of the complete blocking limit state are more 
sensitive to the coupling strength of end offices because its graph has a steeper slope. 
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This is because the fragility of the power substations dominates the fragility function of 
the telecommunication central offices. Instead of operating at higher blocking probability, 
the central offices become completely out of order and influence the overall system 
performance. 
 
Figure 6-7: Sensitivity of Interdependent Fragility Median of Shelby County 
Telecommunication System to Coupling Strength 
 
 
The sensitivity of the fragility dispersion is plotted in Figure 6-8. Higher coupling 
strength results in lower dispersion of the slight and moderate congestion limit states; 
however, the dispersions of the more severe congestion limit states have different trends. 
There are peaks observed between coupling strengths of 0.50 and 0.75. This is caused by 
the increased number of possible states of the system as the coupling strength introduces 
fragility of electric power substations to the interdependent system. 
Earlier in Chapter 4, the effects of the redundancy of telecommunication system 
to the system blocking probability are investigated for a simplified telecommunication 

































4-11) suggest that an increase in the system redundancy only affects the systems that 
originally have less than 50% redundancy. Since the testbed telecommunication system 
has a 77% redundancy from the beginning, adding more links to increase system 
redundancy does not improve the performance system since Figure 6-9 shows no increase 
of the fragility medians. Figure 6-10 also confirms the increase in dispersion when there 
are more possible states of the system available resulting from the additional trunks or 
connections to increase redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Sensitivity of Interdependent Fragility Dispersion of Shelby County 
Telecommunication System to Coupling Strength 
 
 
Besides the overall system performance, the local response should also be 
considered. Figure 6-11, shows the average End-to-End blocking probability at each end 
office. The blocking probability is averaged from End-to-End blocking probability 
between that end office and all other end offices in the system. Since they are averaged, 
the plot only shows slight variation of the average blocking probability. Figure 6-11 
provides insights on local performance of the system. It can be used to identify the end 






























locate important facilities that heavily depend on telecommunication infrastructure such 
as an emergency call center and an electric power control center.   
 Figure 6-11, also indicates significant increase of the average blocking 
probability at higher coupling strengths, Sc. This emphasizes the importance of 




Figure 6-9: Sensitivity of Interdependent Fragility Median of Shelby County 
Telecommunication System to System Redundancy (Coupling Strength = 0.25 for POP, 



































Figure 6-10: Sensitivity of Interdependent Fragility Dispersion of Shelby County 
Telecommunication System to System Redundancy (Coupling Strength = 0.25 for POP, 
0.50 for Tandem Offices and 0.75 for End Offices) 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Local Average End-to-End Blocking Probability for End Offices of the 







































































































































6.3 Telecommunication Dependency of Electric Power System Operations 
The analysis of the telecommunication dependent electric power system in Shelby 
County is presented in this section. This analysis is performed under the assumption that 
all of the communication between local facilities and the electric power control center are 
done over the public telecommunication infrastructure. It is assumed that each electrical 
substation has a connection to a nearby end office. The monitored measurements at a 
local substation are sent frequently through this end office over the telecommunication 
network to the destination end office and to the control center to which it is connected. In 
the event that the blocking probability between the end office at the substation and the 
end office at the control center reaches a high value due to seismic-induced congestion, 
the measured data may become out of date or lost. The loss of measurement data or even 
delayed data could result in less reliable state estimation, a partially observable system, or 
an entirely unobservable system. The quality of state estimation is beyond the scope of 
this study. Rather, this analysis focuses on whether or not the system is observable, and if 
not, the size of the maximum observable island or subnetwork is explored to provide 
insight into the necessary conditions for power operations.    
6.3.1 Measurement Network of Electric Power System in Shelby County, TN 
This analysis assumes a deterministic set of measurements located throughout the 
system. The set includes 38 power injection measurements (one for each generation node 
and each intermediate substation, and 30 measurements at distribution circuits) and 108 
branch measurements (about 78% of the total of 139 branches). Each of the 
measurements is connected to a telecommunication end office. In normal daily operation, 
this set of the measurements is assumed to be sufficient to observe the entire system with 
some redundant measurements to ensure quality of the state estimation. In this analysis, it 
is assumed that observability is independent of the power flow or the function of the 
substation. Therefore, observability only implies that the system is reliably controllable 
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which does not always mean that electricity can be delivered. For instance, a system 
might be 50% observable after an earthquake but electricity might be delivered to only 
70% of the observable subnetwork due to physical damage to some of the substations in 
the subnetwork. 
Finally, it should be noted that this analysis is performed under these high-level 
assumptions (e.g. the measurements at substations and transmission lines are real and 
reactive power only, no voltage magnitude is measured and the placement of the 
measurements is random while the placement of measurement in the real system is 
consciously engineered) because this work aims to provide a foundational framework for 
cyber interdependency analysis. A more comprehensive analysis should be developed in 
future work. 
6.3.2 Telecommunication Dependent Fragility of Electric Power System Operations 
Figure 6-12 through Figure 6-15 present the telecommunication dependent 
fragility curves of the Shelby County electric power system for various assumed locations 
of the control center. The limit states for the fragility functions are 25%, 50%, 75% and 
100% unobservability. It should be noted that these sets of fragility curves are derived 
from the assumption that the measurement data are lost when the local measurement 
cannot be transmitted to the control center in a timely basis defined as within 5 minutes 
from the time that each measurement is taken. In this case, the setup time of each 
connection is assumed to be 30 seconds and each blocked attempt is reconnected 
immediately until successful. From this set of assumptions, the measurement will be 
considered lost when there are more than 10 retrial attempts to connect to the control 
center or equivalently that the end-to-end blocking probability is 90% (extensive 
congestion limit state) between the end office at the local measurement location and the 
one at the control center. 
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Figure 6-12: Telecommunication Dependent Seismic Fragility Curves of Electric Power 
system Operation for System with Control Center at E01 Central Office (Figure 6-3) 
 
 
Each figure provides the relationship between seismic intensity and the 
probability that the electric power system is partially unobservable more than some 
certain percentages. For example, Figure 6-12 suggests that, at 0.2g PGA, there is a 70 % 
probability that more than 25% of the entire electric power system becomes unobservable 
due the loss of local measurements which cannot be transmitted to the control center, or 
there is a 32 % chance that the power system will be completely unobservable due to the 
same cause. The plot also indicates that for a given 60% probability, the system is likely 
to be more than 25%, 50%, 75% or completely unobservable at 0.18g, 0.20g, 0.22g, and 
0.30g PGA, respectively. In other words, the fragility curves represent the vulnerability 
of the electric power control center to perform state estimation which is a critical task 
required for reliable operation and control of the power grid.   
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Figure 6-13: Telecommunication Dependent Seismic Fragility Curves of Electric Power 
system Operation for System with Control Center at E10 Central Office (Figure 6-3) 
 
 
In normal daily operations, there are always some measurements that are lost due 
to the malfunction of meters or the loss of connections. In such cases, the control center 
will estimate the measurements from recently received data and use it to perform state 
estimation. However, under seismic stresses, it is highly likely that the topology of the 
system will be altered due to the loss of remote substations or other facilities. In this 
situation, the estimated measurement used in the normal daily operation is not likely to 
represent the lost measurement. Therefore, it is more likely that portions of the electric 
power system become unobservable due to the loss of measurements after an earthquake 
than on normal days. 
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Figure 6-14: Telecommunication Dependent Seismic Fragility Curves of Electric Power 
system Operation for System with Control Center at E20 Central Office (Figure 6-3) 
 
 
Figure 6-15: Telecommunication Dependent Seismic Fragility Curves of Electric Power 
system Operation for System with Control Center at E30 Central Office (Figure 6-3) 
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The connections between local measurements and the control center are vital to 
observability of the power grid and dependent upon the performance of 
telecommunication infrastructure. As seen in Figure 6-11, some end offices perform at a 
lower blocking probability than others. Therefore the location of the end office associated 
with the control center will influence the observability of the power system. Figure 6-12 
through Figure 6-15 show the different fragility curves of the systems whose control 
centers are located at different locations and are therefore associated with different end 
offices. From the plots, there are slight variations among the first three systems while the 
last system is significantly more vulnerable than the others. The sensitivities of the log-
normal fragility parameters to the properties of the end offices associating with the 
control centers are presented in Figure 6-16 through Figure 6-19. 
 
Figure 6-16: Sensitivity of the Interdependent Fragility Median of Shelby County 
Electric Power system to Average Local Blocking Probability of the Control Center End 
Office. 
 
Figure 6-16 is the sensitivity plot of the interdependent fragility median for the 































be lower (more vulnerable) when the control center is associated with an end office 
which operates at a high blocking probability. The same trend is also found in the 
sensitivity of the fragility dispersion (Figure 6-17). It is also noted that both the median 
and dispersion of the fragility curve of the most severe limit state (100% unobservable) 
are more sensitive to the average blocking probability.  
 
Figure 6-17: Sensitivity of the Interdependent Fragility Dispersion of Shelby County 




In Figure 6-18 and Figure 6-19, the sensitivity of the fragility median and 
dispersion to the vertex degree of the control center end office are presented. As 
expected, the observability of the power system is more reliable (higher median and 
higher dispersion) when the control center connects to an end office with high vertex 
degree. This is because high vertex degree represents high number of alternative routes 
which increases the chances that more measured data can be delivered to the control 




























connections. This information is expected to be useful in the process of selecting the 
control centers for a newly designed electric power system. 
 
Figure 6-18: Sensitivity of the Interdependent Fragility Median of Shelby County 
Electric Power system to Vertex Degree of the Control Center End Office. 
 
 
Figure 6-19: Sensitivity of the Interdependent Fragility Dispersion of Shelby County 

























































6.4 Seismic Mitigation Strategies for Interdependent Systems 
The previous section presents the results of the two interdependent analyses 
performed on the Shelby County testbed telecommunication and electric power systems. 
Some of the sensitivity analysis results suggest factors which affect performance of the 
interdependent systems. This useful information is reviewed again in this section in an 
attempt to provide basic guidelines for seismic mitigation strategies. 
6.4.1 Electric Power Dependency of Telecommunication Systems  
The results from the analysis show a strong correlation between coupling strength 
and fragility of the interdependent systems. Therefore it is logical that decreasing the 
coupling strength between a telecommunication central office and an electric power 
substation is one of the high priority actions in attempts to mitigate seismic effects on the 
interdependent telecommunication system. This can be achieved by installing more 
reliable electric power backup systems which are designed for seismic hazards. 
Another mitigation action is to increase the redundancy of the telecommunication 
system. The results from the study indicated that increasing redundancy (adding more 
connections or trunks) to a low redundant telecommunication system may significantly 
reduce the blocking probability of local central offices and the overall system. However, 
the improvement in the performance of systems with high redundancy is insignificant. 
This is because more routes provided by the additional connections do not contribute to 
system performance due to the constraints of the routing rules. 
The study also demonstrates poor system performance of the interdependent 
telecommunication system when electric substations with high vertex degree exist in the 
interdependent adjacency. This implies that there are many central offices which are 
dependent on one substation. This situation is not desirable but yet may be unavoidable, 
especially in high population areas. In cases where this condition cannot be controlled, 
reducing coupling strength should be the alternative mitigation strategy. 
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Improving fragilities of network components is also an important seismic 
mitigation action. In practice, it is impossible to improve all the components at the same 
time. More study on the contribution of individual components is required to establish 
more efficient strategies for maximizing the improvement of the system performance 
given limited resources. 
Because one of the seismic effects on telecommunication systems is the seismic-
induced communication demand, increasing the capacity of network components (e.g. 
central offices and trunks) is another reasonable mitigation action. However, it should be 
noted that the efficiency of this mitigation strategy depends on the seismic performance 
of the components to withstand seismic-induced physical damage because the additional 
capacity will become useless if the components are not functional. Therefore, improving 
fragility functions and increasing capacities of network components should be done in 
parallel. 
The deployment of alternative independent telecommunication systems such as 
two-way radio communication systems and satellite telephone systems is one of the most 
efficient post-disaster mitigation actions. This strategy has been used by most of 
emergency service agencies and utilities during the recovery process after disaster events.  
Recently, some computer scientists at Georgia Institute of Technology have 
developed a new telecommunication system called LifeNet. The system uses computer 
software to allow connections among computers and smart phones which are WiFi 
enabled. It operates independently from the primary telecommunication infrastructure 
and is specifically designed to provide communication when the primary 





6.4.2 Telecommunication Dependency of Electric Power Operations 
From the study of telecommunication dependency of electric power operations, 
the observability is completely dependent on the performance of the telecommunication 
infrastructure. Therefore, the mitigation actions discussed earlier for the interdependent 
telecommunication influence the observability indirectly. 
Another mean of improving observability of an electric power system is to reduce 
the degree of dependency between the two systems. This may be done by providing other 
means of connections between local measurement and the control center which are not 
operated on public networks, but such connections must be robust to seismic hazard to 
avoid seismic-induced interference that can block or cause delay in data transmission. 
There are some recent studies (Meliopoulos et al. 2006, Mohagheghi et al. 2007, 
Stefopoulos et al. 2007) on utilizing global positioning system  
(GPS) signals to locally monitor voltage phase angles (one of the two state variables). 
This approach allows localized state estimation in lieu of the traditional centralized state 
estimation at the control center. This results in an observability of the electric power 
systems which is less dependent on data transmission over the telecommunication 
infrastructure.   
6.5 Summary 
The analyses of the two interdependencies: (1) electric power dependency of 
telecommunication system and (2) telecommunication dependency of electric power 
operations discussed in Chapter 5 are applied to the Shelby County testbed 
telecommunication and electric power systems. The testbed systems are synthesized from 
publically available data. Component fragility and congestion models derived in Chapter 
3 are used as the inputs for the analyses. The results illustrate the application of the cyber 
interdependency analysis to an electric power system and demonstrate the amplification 
of the vulnerability of the system due to these interdependencies. Sensitivity analyses of 
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the system to interdependence parameters such as coupling strength, vertex degree of 
interdependent adjacency, and redundancy ratio are performed. The results from the 
study indicate that seismic performance of telecommunication systems is highly sensitive 
to coupling strength. Fragility medians of a telecommunication system can be 
overestimated by up to100% if its dependency on electric power system is not 
considered. The influence of telecommunication system redundancy on seismic 
performance is also studied. The results confirm that increases in the redundancy of 
telecommunication systems only improve the seismic performance of low redundant 
systems. The results from cyber interdependent system analysis also demonstrate the 
influence of the telecommunication end office associated with the electric power control 
center. The study suggests that electric power observability of power grids is more 
reliable if the control center is associated with an end office with high vertex degree. This 
is because more connections to the end office increase the chance that measured data are 
delivered to the control center. In the end of this chapter the results from the study are 
used to establish preliminary recommendations for seismic mitigations such as reducing 
coupling strengths, increasing system redundancy, improving component fragilities and 
capacities, providing alternative telecommunication systems, relocating the electric 
control center, and utilizing localized state estimation. (1982b, a, 1985b, 1989, 1990, 
1990, 1993, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2002, 2002, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2004, 2005, 2005, 2005, 2005, 2005, 2006, 2006, 2007, 2007, 2007, 2007, 2008, 




CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Modern society and economies depend heavily on the electric power and 
telecommunication infrastructures. Disruptions of these two critical lifelines are not 
desirable but yet are unavoidable, especially during natural disasters. The consequences 
to the individual infrastructures of such events have been widely studied; however, the 
interdependencies between these two systems have not been sufficiently explored. Due to 
the rapid improvement in technology, these two infrastructure systems are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. Failure of one system is likely to shift vital influence to the 
other. Therefore, understanding interdependencies between electric power and 
telecommunication systems is considered one of the most critical tasks in an attempt to 
minimize disruptions and mitigate negative effects to society and economies. 
This final chapter summarizes the results from the present investigation of the 
interdependent response of electric power and telecommunication systems. It also 
discusses the significance of this study, its applications, and its contributions to the 
research communities. Finally, this chapter suggests some relevant future work which is 
essential to the advancement of infrastructure interdependency field. 
7.1 Conclusions 
There have been a number of studies on the effects of earthquake hazard on 
critical infrastructure systems. Most of this published work focuses on individual 
performance of individual network systems and tries to improve overall system 
performance by strengthening individual network components without considering the 
interaction within the systems. There are only a few attempts to try to understand the 
interaction within these systems and there are even fewer studies addressing the 
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interdependence across different systems. In the last two decades, some studies (Nojima 
and Kameda 1991, Rinaldi et al. 2001, Rinaldi 2004) have explicitly recognized and 
categorized interdependencies between infrastructure systems. However these studies do 
not explore in depth interdependent effects on the performance of the systems, although 
there are a few more recent studies (Dueñas-Osorio 2005, Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2006, 
Duenas-Osorio et al. 2007a, Duenas-Osorio et al. 2007b, Kim et al. 2007) on the 
interdependencies between transmission and distribution infrastructure systems such as 
electric power systems, potable water systems, and oil and gas transmission systems. The 
studies of the interdependencies between telecommunication infrastructure systems, 
which are queuing network systems, and the other critical infrastructure systems are still 
rare. Therefore, this work is aimed at creating a foundational framework for the study of 
the telecommunication infrastructure and its interdependency with other systems. 
One of the first tasks to evaluate the seismic performance of infrastructure 
systems is to understand the seismic hazard and its effects on the systems. Strong ground 
motion from a seismic hazard causes physical damage to both electric power and 
telecommunication network components, and this leads to a rise in communication 
demand on telecommunication systems. In this study, fragility functions are used as 
probabilistic representations of physical damage while traffic theory is proposed to 
capture the effect of high communication demands. Due to the nature of 
telecommunication systems, traffic theory is the most suitable concept for quantifying 
their seismic performance by using blocking probabilities as performance indexes. 
This study recognizes three different sources of seismic-induced demand: (1) 
communication among subscribers within earthquake affected area, (2) communication 
between emergency service agencies and subscribers in earthquake affected area, and (3) 
communication attempts from subscribers outside earthquake affected area. From the 
demographic signature of the target area of study, these three sources are mathematically 
modeled using a renewal process with Weibull probability distribution as interarrival 
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time, holding time, and interarrival of retrial demand. Unlike normal daily 
communication demands which are modeled using traditional Poisson process, the 
renewal process with a Weibull distribution is preferable in the disastrous situation where 
the demands are driven by a correlated cause and lack a memoryless property. From these 
demand models, it is possible to establish the relationships between seismic intensity and 
level of blocking probability for telecommunication components which are used in the 
evaluation of the overall system performance. The renewal process congestion model 
demonstrates component blocking probabilities of up to 2% higher than the Poisson 
process model. The results also indicate the importance of retrial attempts to component 
blocking probability. The component blocking probability can be underestimated by 
1.3% if retrial attempts are not considered in the simulation.    
In order to perform system evaluation analysis, understanding topology and the 
nature of the systems is vital. The goal of electric power systems is to transmit and 
distribute electricity from generation units which are normally located in remote areas to 
end users in cities or industrial areas, while telecommunication systems aim to provide 
connections to subscribers over shared resources. The distinction between the two 
systems must be recognized in the evaluation of the interdependent system. 
In practice, electrical engineers use a physics based power flow algorithm to 
analyze and design electric power grids. The algorithm is simple to understand and apply 
but it requires detailed input of the system; however, most of this detailed information 
about power grids are sensitive to public security and are rarely available. In this study, a 
simplified optimal network flow analysis is utilized to evaluate electric power systems in 
lieu of the electric power flow algorithm in an attempt to relax the intensive input 
requirement. The proposed optimal network flow analysis and the traditional power flow 
analysis are tested on the 24-bus IEEE reliability test system. The results from the 
optimal network flow and the power flow algorithm agree with acceptable tolerance. 
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Unlike an electric power system, a telecommunication system is not a 
transmission-distribution network. Its subscribers access the system for connections to 
other subscribers, so a telecommunication system behaves like a queuing network. 
Because not all subscribers use service of telecommunication network at the same time, 
the systems are engineered so that a number of subscribers share limited resources. It has 
always been the goal in design of telecommunication systems to provide minimum 
resources while trying to achieve an acceptable Grade of Service (GOS) during normal 
daily operation. As a result, the systems become vulnerable to rare events when 
communication demands are abnormally high. 
In order to evaluate the performance of a telecommunication system, it is 
important to understand how telecommunication systems manage resources or route 
connections between origins and destinations. Since the birth of communication 
infrastructure systems, routing algorithms have been continuously improved and have 
become highly sophisticated. However, a basic objective is to route a connection over the 
shortest path possible to minimize the use of resources and maximize quality of the 
connection. From this fundamental objective, this study develops a simple routing to 
simulate the operation of telecommunication system for seismic performance evaluation 
of the systems subjected to the loss of components and the concurrent increase in 
communication demand. This results in the newly developed framework for seismic 
fragility analysis of telecommunication systems employed in this work. 
In the study of the interdependencies between telecommunication and electric 
power systems, the relationship between the systems must be clearly defined. This study 
focuses on two types of interdependencies: (1) electric power dependency of 
telecommunication systems and (2) telecommunication dependent of electric power 
systems operation. 
The first dependency is defined as physical coupling between network 
components of the two systems. The failure of electric power substations affects 
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telecommunication central offices directly. This relationship is straightforward and 
similar to dependencies between other transmission-distribution infrastructure systems. 
This type of dependency is characterized by three important components: (1) 
interdependent adjacency, (2) probabilistic formulation, and (3) coupling strength. The 
interdependent analysis is performed for the Shelby County infrastructure systems. The 
results indicate significant degradation of the telecommunication system performance due 
to the interdependency. The seismic performance of telecommunication system can be 
overestimated by up to 100% when the interdependency is not properly considered. This 
can be seen in the fragility function for the network components, but it is clearer in the 
sensitivity of the telecommunication system seismic fragility median to coupling 
strength. Therefore, improving the coupling strength is one of the most effective 
mitigation actions. This can be achieved by providing more reliable power backup or 
additional power resources. In the study of low redundancy telecommunication system, 
the results suggest improvement of system performance by increasing the redundancy 
such as by adding connections within the systems. However, this mitigation strategy is 
not efficient for high redundancy (more than 50%) systems such as the Shelby County 
telecommunication system and perhaps other telecommunication systems in metropolitan 
areas. This is because the additional connections do not contribute to performance of the 
systems due to the constraints of the routing rules. This study also suggests that high 
vertex degree in the interdependent adjacency results in a vulnerable interdependent 
telecommunication system because many telecommunication central offices depend on 
only one power substation. When the substation fails, it is likely that the functionality of 
the central offices that depend on it would be affected. However, this situation may be 
unavoidable, especially in metropolitan areas where many central offices are located in 
the same service area of an electric power substation. In this case, additional or more 
reliable power backup systems for these central offices are required in order to reduce the 
coupling strength for seismic mitigation. 
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   The second dependency is a cyber interdependency. This type of 
interdependency relates to information technology. For an electric power system, the 
cyber interdependency arises from the use of SCADA systems to provide reliable system 
control and operation. A SCADA system allows the electric power control center to 
collect measurement data from geographically distributed sensors in the network and to 
perform state estimation. The results from state estimation are used by the control center 
to determine a course of action to maintain stability of the overall system. However, there 
are some situations when the SCADA system fails to collect sufficient data to perform 
accurate state estimation. In this case, the control center may not have an accurate state 
estimation of the system and this may result in improper control actions which can affect 
the stability of the power system.  
In an earthquake, it is very likely that the communication infrastructure is 
compromised. In this situation, failure in telecommunication system may affect the 
performance of the SCADA system and therefore the observability of the system (the 
ability of the control center to perform state estimation). From this complex relationship, 
a cyber interdependency analysis is developed using high-level simplifying assumptions 
such as types and locations of measurements and connections between the measurements 
and end offices in order to provide a foundational framework for the study of this type of 
interdependency. This analysis is then applied to the Shelby County testbed. The results 
from the test case demonstrate the influence of the local performance of the 
telecommunication system on the electric power system observability. The topological 
properties of the telecommunication end office associated with the electric power control 
center can be used to estimate reliability of the observability. The study indicates that 
locating the control center near the end office with high vertex degree may improve 
reliability of electric power system observability by up to 30%. Suggestions on how to 
relax cyber interdependency are suggested based on the results from the study. 
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One of the greatest challenges in this study is obtaining the specification of 
electric power and telecommunication systems. Even though, the application of the 
proposed framework can be demonstrated through the systems synthesized and estimated 
from basic information such as population, service areas, and distance of transmission 
lines, the advantages of this framework can be further enhanced when applying it to the 
systems with complete sets of detailed configurations. The availability of the detailed 
specification (e.g. voltage and power rating of transmission lines and substations, and 
capacity of generation units for electric power systems, or the real capacity of central 
offices and trunks, the number of subscribers per an end office, and the exact connections 
between central offices for telecommunication systems) allows more precise algorithm to 
be used in lieu of the simplified algorithm used in this study (e.g. physical power flow 
analysis in lieu of optimal network flow analysis).     
7.2 Applications and Future Research 
The proposed methods are basic tools for assessing the seismic response of two 
critical infrastructure systems. These methods physical and cyber interdependencies 
between the systems into account in an attempt to provide more accurate results 
simulating the real situation. Due to the inherent uncertainty of the problem the 
methodologies are developed based on probability concepts. This research focuses on 
developing the algorithms which apply to telecommunication systems and its 
interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. As one of only a few studies in this 
area, this work is expected to provide a foundational framework for future study on cyber 
and other type of interdependencies among infrastructure systems. Finally, the algorithms 
and simulation developed in this study are aimed to aid decision making processes in 
urban planning and seismic mitigation investment. 
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This study initiates new ways to model the interdependent issues between 
infrastructure systems under stresses. However, there are some important issues which 
need to be addressed in any future research. These include: 
 
 Collection of usage data from a telecommunication system in order to validate 
and refine seismic-induced congestion models. 
 Development of models to estimate the existing coupling strength between 
network components. 
 Development of models to address the dependency of the telecommunication 
infrastructure on recovery after an earthquake. 
 Application of the proposed method in multi-hazard situations. 
 Investigation of the higher-order interdependency between infrastructure 
systems to simulate and investigate cascading failure. 
 Investigation of effects of localized improvements on overall system 
performance in order to develop algorithms to maximize system performance 
by improving a limited number of components. 
  Exploration of the localized or decentralized state estimation algorithm 
sensitivity and vulnerability to seismic hazards. 
 Development of comprehensive models to evaluate both adequacy and 
security of electric power system performance under seismic hazards. 
 Development of the model representing mobile telephone systems at the base 
station subsystem level (including a number of cell towers and devices used 
by subscribers). 
 Development of the model representing electric power distribution systems. 





Abrahamson, N. A., and W. J. Silva (1993). Attenuation of Long Period Strong Ground 
Motions. Proceedings of the 1993 Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, July 
25, 1993 - July 29, 1993, Denver, CO, USA, Publ by ASME. 
Abur, A. (2004). Power System State Estimation Theory and Implementation. New York, 
N.Y., Marcel Dekker. 
Adachi, T. (2007). Impact of Cascading Failures on Performance Assessment of Civil 
Infrastructure Systems. PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Adachi, T., and B. R. Ellingwood (2008). "Serviceability of Earthquake-Damaged Water 
Systems: Effects of Electrical Power Availability and Power Backup Systems on 
System Vulnerability." Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93(1): 78-88. 
Adachi, T., and B. R. Ellingwood (2009a). "Serviceability Assessment of a Municipal 
Water System under Spatially Correlated Seismic Intensities." Computer-Aided 
Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 24(4): 237-248. 
Adachi, T., and B. R. Ellingwood (2009b). "Serviceability Assessment of Electrical 
Power Transmission Systems under Probabilistically Stated Seismic Hazards: 
Case Study for Shelby County, Tennessee." Structure and Infrastructure 
Engineering 5(5): 343-353. 
Adachi, T., and B. R. Ellingwood (2010). "Comparative Assessment of Civil 
Infrastructure Network Performance under Probabilistic and Scenario 
Earthquakes." Journal of Infrastructure Systems 16(1): 1-10. 
Adamson, S. C. G., Steven P. (1993). "Analysis of Two Trunk Congestion Relief 
Schemes." 
Alber, J., and M. Poller (2006). Observability of Power Systems Based on Fast 
Pseudorank Calculation of Sparse Sensitivity Matrices. IEEE Power Engineering 
Society Transmission and Distribution Conference, PES TD 2005/2006, May 21, 
2006 - May 24, 2006, Dallas, TX, United states, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Inc. 
 150 
Amin, M. (2000). "Toward Self-Healing Infrastructure Systems." IEEE Computer 
Magazine 33(8): 44-53. 
Ang, A. H.-S., and W. H. Tang (2007). Probability Concepts in Engineering-Emphasis of 
Applications to Civil and Environmental Engineering, Wiley. 
Applied Technology Council (1985). Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California. 
Redwood City, California, Applied Technology Council (ATC): 492. 
Applied Technology Council (1991). Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of 
Lifelines in the Conterminous United States. Redwood City, California, Applied 
Technology Council (ATC): 440. 
Archuleta, R. J., W. B. Joyner, and D. M. Boore (1979). "Methodology for Predicting 
Ground Motion at Specific Sites." Geological Survey Circular (United 
States)(Compendex): 26-36. 
ASCE (2011). Lifelines Performance Assessment Preliminary Summary: Tohoku Off 
Shore Earthquake & Tsunami, Japan. 
AT&T Bell Laboratories (1983). Engineering and Operations in the Bell System. Murray 
Hill, New Jersey. 
Atkinson, G. M., and D. M. Boore (1990). "Recent Trends in Ground Motion and 
Spectral Response Relations for North America." Earthquake Spectra 6(1): 15-35. 
Atkinson, G. M., and D. M. Boore (2006). "Earthquake Ground-Motion Prediction 
Equations for Eastern North America." Bulletin of the Seismological Society of 
America 96(Compendex): 2181-2205. 
Balijepalli, N. V., Subrahmanyam, S.; Richter, Charles W.; Christie, Richard D.; Longo, 
Vito J. (2005). "Distribution System Reliability Assessment Due to Lightning 
Stroms." IEEE Transaction on Power Delivery 20(3). 
Beavers, J. E. (2003). Advancing Mitigation Technologies and Disaster Response for 
Lifeline Systems : Proceedings of the Sixth U.S. Conference and Workshop on 
Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, August 10-13, 2003, Long Beach, California. 
Reston, Va. : , American Society of Civil Engineers. 
 151 
Bellamy, J. C. (2000). Digital Telephony. Coppell, Texas, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Billinton, R., and W. Li (1994). Reliability Assessment of Electric Power Systems Using 
Monte Carlo Methods New York, Plenum Press. 
Billinton, R. K. S. C., N.; Chu, K.; Debnath, K.; Goel, L.;Khan, E.; Kos, P.;Nourbakhsh 
G.; Oteng-Adjei, J. (1989). "A Reliability Test System for Educational Purposes - 
Basic Data." IEEE Transaction on Power Systems 4(3): 7. 
Bobbio, A., R. Terruggia, A. Boellis, E. Ciancamerla, and M. Minichino (2007). A Tool 
for Network Reliability Analysis. 26th International Conference on Computer 
Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2007, September 18, 2007 - 
September 21, 2007, Nuremberg, Germany, Springer Verlag. 
Bolt, B. (1993). Abridged Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, Earthquakes - Newly 
Revised and Expanded, W.H. Freeman and Co.: 331. 
Booker, G., J. Torres, S. Guikema, A. Sprintson, and K. Brumbelow (2010). "Estimating 
Cellular Network Performance During Hurricanes." Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety 95(Compendex): 337-344. 
Breuer, L., and D. Baum (2005). An Introduction to Queueing Theory and Matrix-
Analytic Method. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Springer. 
Brooks, J. D., Rod "Analyzing Security Assessment Schemes in Traditional Networks." 
Campbell, K. W. (2003). "Prediction of Strong Ground Motion Using the Hybrid 
Empirical Method and Its Use in the Development of Ground-Motion 
(Attenuation) Relations in Eastern North America." Bulletin of the Seismological 
Society of America 93(Compendex): 1012-1033. 
Campbell, K. W., and Y. Bozorgnia (1994). "Empirical Analysis of Strong Ground 
Motion from the 1992 Landers, California, Earthquake." Bulletin of the 
Seismological Society of America 84(Compendex): 573-588. 
Cancho, R., C. Janssen, and R. Solé (2001). "Topology of Technology Graphs: Small 
World Patterns in Electronic Circuits." Physical Review E 64(4). 
 152 
Carreras, B. A., V. E. Lynch, I. Dobson, and D. E. Newman (2004). "Complex Dynamics 
of Blackouts in Power Transmission Systems." Chaos 14(3): 643-652. 
Chang, S. E., H. A. Seligson, and R. T. Eguchi (1995). Estimation of Economic Losses 
Caused by a Disruption of Lifeline Service. San Francisco, CA, USA, ASCE: 48. 
Chassin, D. P. P., Christian (2005). "Evaluating North America Electric Grid Reliability 
Using the Barabasi-Albert Network Model." 
Clements, K. A., G. R. Krumpholz, and P. W. Davis (1982a). "Power System State 
Estimation with Measurement Deficiency: An Algorithm That Determines the 
Maximal Observable Subnetwork." IEEE transactions on power apparatus and 
systems PAS-101(Copyright 1983, IEE): 3044-3052. 
Clements, K. A., G. R. Krumpholz, and P. W. Davis (1982b). "State Estimator 
Measurement System Reliability Evaluation - an Efficient Algorithm Based on 
Topological Observability Theory." IEEE transactions on power apparatus and 
systems PAS-101(Compendex): 997-1004. 
Conrad, S. H. O. R., Gerard P. "An Overview of Energy and Telecommunications 
Interdependencies Modeling at Nisac ". 
Cortereal, M., and L. Gouveia (2007). "Network Flow Models for the Local Access 
Network Expansion Problem." Computers & Operations Research 34(4): 1141-
1157. 
David, G. R., J. A. Douglas, and J. Larry (2006). Impact of Distributed Energy Resources 
on the Reliability of Critical Telecommunications Facilities. Telecommunications 
Energy Conference, 2006. INTELEC '06. 28th Annual International. 
Dobson, I. N., D. E.; Carreras, B. A.; Lunch, V. E. (2002). "An Initial Complex System 
Analysis of the Risk of Blackout in Power Transmission Systems." 
Dorogovtsev, S. N. M., J. F. F. (2002). "Evolution of Networks." Advances in Physics 
51(4): 109. 
Dueñas-Osorio, L. (2005). Interdependent Response of Networked Systems to Natural 
Hazards and Intentional Disruptions. Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, Georgia 
Institute of Technology. 
 153 
Duenas-Osorio, L., J. I. Craig, and B. J. Goodno (2007a). "Seismic Response of Critical 
Interdependent Networks." Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics 
36(2): 285-306. 
Duenas-Osorio, L., J. I. Craig, B. J. Goodno, and A. Bostrom (2007b). "Interdependent 
Response of Networked Systems." Journal of Infrastructure Systems 13(3): 185-
194. 
Dueñas-Osorio, L., K. Leelardcharoen, J. I. Craig, and B. J. Goodno (2006). Failure of 
Interdependent Networks. The 8th National Conference in Earthquake 
Engineering, San Francisco, CA. 
Elmakias, D. (2008). New Computational Methods in Power System Reliability Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 
Erlang, A. K. (1925). "Probability Theory Applied to Telephony." Annales des Postes, 
Telegraphes et Telephones 4: 617-644. 
Erlang, A. K. (1926). "Calculations of Probabilities in Telephony." Revue Generale de 
l'Electricite 20: 270-278. 
Exposito, A. G., and A. Abur (1998). "Generalized Observability Analysis and 
Measurement Classification." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 13(3): 1090-
1095. 
Exposito, A. G., A. Abur, and E. R. Ramos (1995). On the Use of Loop Equations in 
Power System Analysis. Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE International Symposium 
on Circuits and Systems-ISCAS 95. Part 3 (of 3), April 30, 1995 - May 3, 1995, 
Seattle, WA, USA, IEEE. 
Faza, A., S. Sedigh, and B. M. McMillin (2007). "Reliability Modeling for the Advanced 
Electric Power Grid." 
Faza, A., S. Sedigh, and B. M. McMillin (2008). "The Advanced Electric Power Grid-
Complexity Reduction Techiques for Reliability Modeling." 
Faza, A., S. Sedigh, and B. M. McMillin (2009). "Reliability Analysis for the Advanced 
Electric Power Grid from Cyber Control and Communicaiton to Physical 
Manifestations of Failure." 
 154 
FEMA (2004). Fema 450: The 2003 Nehrp Recommended Provisions for New Building 
and Other Structures. Washington D.C., Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). 
Fink, G. V. (1994). Innovative Network Modeling and Simulation Tool. IEEE MILCOM. 
Fioriti, V., S. Ruzzante, E. Castorini, A. Di Pietro, and A. Tofani (2009). Modelling 
Critical Infrastructures in Presence of Lack of Data with Simulated Annealing - 
Like Algorithms. 28th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, 
and Security, SAFECOMP 2009, September 15, 2009 - September 18, 2009, 
Hamburg, Germany, Springer Verlag. 
Frost, V. S. M., Benjamin (1994). "Traffic Modeling for Telecommunications Networks." 
IEEE Communication Magazine. 
Georgia Institute of Technology. (2011). "Georgia Tech Researchers Demo Disaster 
Communications System "   Retrieved August 17, 2011, from 
http://www.gatech.edu/newsroom/release.html?nid=69356. 
Ghiraldi, A. Z., Ervino "Survivability of Reliable Telecommunications Equipment 
Enclosures through Natural Diasters." 
Glass, R. J. B., Walt E.; Stamber, Kevin L. "Advanced Simulation for Analysis of 
Critical Infrastructure- Abstract Cascades, the Electric Power Grid, and Fedwire." 
Guimerà, R., A. Arenas, A. Díaz-Guilera, and F. Giralt (2002). "Dynamical Properties of 
Model Communication Networks." Physical Review E 66(2). 
Gutenberg, B., and C. F. Richter (1941). "Seismicity of Earth." Geological Society of 
America -- Special Paper: 131. 
Gutenberg, B., and C. F. Richter (1949). Seismicity of Earth and Associated Phenomena. 
Princeton, NJ, United States, Princeton University Press. 
Heller, M. (2001). Interdependencies in Civil Infrastructure Systems. The Bridge. 31: 9-
15. 
 155 
Houck, D. J., E. Kim, G. P. O'Reilly, D. D. Picklesimer, and H. Uzunalioglu (2004). "A 
Network Survivability Model for Critical Nation Infrastructures." Bell Labs 
Technical Journal 8(4): 153-172. 
Hwang, H., and J. Huo (1997). "Attenuation Relations of Ground Motion for Rock and 
Soil Sites in Eastern United States." Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 
16: 363-372. 
Hwang, H., H. Lin, and J.-R. Huo (1997). "Site Coefficients for Design of Building in 
Eastern United States." Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 16: 29-40. 
IEEE Reliability Test System Task Force (1979). "Ieee Reliability Test System." IEEE 
transactions on power apparatus and systems PAS-98(6): 8. 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2005). Ieee Recommended Practice for 
Seismic Design of Substation. New York, New York, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. 
International Telecommunication Union. (2009). "Free Statistics."   Retrieved July 4, 
2009, from http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. 
Jain, A., R. Balasubramanian, and S. C. Tripathy (2008). Topological Observability: 
Artificial Neural Network Application Based Solution for a Practical Power 
System. 40th North American Power Symposium, NAPS2008, September 28, 
2009 - September 30, 2009, Calgary, AB, Canada, IEEE Computer Society. 
Jain, A., R. Balasubramanian, S. C. Tripathy, B. N. Singh, and Y. Kawazoe (2005). 
Power System Topological Observability Analysis Using Artificial Neural 
Networks. 2005 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 12-16 June 
2005, Piscataway, NJ, USA, IEEE. 
Jayaram, N., and J. W. Baker (2009). "Correlation Model for Spatially Distributed 
Ground-Motion Intensities." Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 
38(15): 12. 
Jrad, A., G. O'Reilly, S. H. Richman, S. Conrad, and A. Kelic (2007). Dynamic Changes 
in Subscriber Behavior and Their Impact on the Telecom Network in Cases of 
Emergency. MILCOM 2006, 23-25 Oct. 2006, Piscataway, NJ, USA, IEEE. 
 156 
Jrad, A., H. Uzunalioglu, D. J. Houck, G. O'Reilly, S. Conrad, and W. Beyeler (2005). 
Wireless and Wireline Network Interactions in Disaster Scenarios. MILCOM 
2005: Military Communications Conference 2005, October 17, 2005 - October 
20, 2005, Atlatnic City, NJ, United states, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers Inc. 
Kang, S. W., and A. P. Meliopoulos (2002). Contingency Selection Via Quadratized 
Power Flow Sensitivity Analysis. 2002 IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer 
Meeting, July 21, 2002 - July 25, 2002, Chicago, IL, United states, Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 
Kim, Y., B. F. Spencer, J. Song, A. S. Elnashai, and T. Stokes (2007). Seismic 
Performance Assessment of Interdependent Lifeline Systems, Mid-America 
Earthquake Center: 39. 
Krumpholz, G. R., K. A. Clements, and P. W. David (1980). "Power System 
Observability: A Practical Algorithm Using Network Topology." IEEE 
transactions on power apparatus and systems PAS-99(4): 1534-1542. 
Laprie, J.-C., K. Kanoun, and M. Kaaniche (2007). Modelling Interdependencies between 
the Electricity and Information Infrastructures. 26th International Conference on 
Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2007, September 18, 
2007 - September 21, 2007, Nuremberg, Germany, Springer Verlag. 
Leelardcharoen, K. (2005). Interdependent Performance of Power Ans Water Networks. 
Student Leadership Council Online Magazine. Urbana, Il, Mid-America 
Earthquake Center. 5: 1-23. 
Leelardcharoen, K., L. Dueñas-Osorio, J. I. Craig, and B. J. Goodno (2011). Seismic 
Fragility Analysis of Telecommunication Systems. 11th International Conference 
of Applications of Statistics and Probabilistic in Civil Engineering, ETH Zurich, 
Switzerland, CRC Press. 
Lemaréchal, C., A. Ouorou, and G. Petrou (2010). "Robust Network Design in 
Telecommunications under Polytope Demand Uncertainty." European Journal of 
Operational Research 206(3): 634-641. 
Li, W. (2005). Risk Assessment of Power Systems: Models, Methods, and Applications 
Piscataway, NJ, IEEE Press. 
 157 
Liu, K. S. (1980). "Direct Distance Dialing: Call Completion and Customer Retrial 
Behavior." The Bells System Technical Journal 59(3): 295-311. 
MAEC. (2006). "Research Projects and Goals."   Retrieved March 18, 2011, from 
http://mae.cee.uiuc.edu/projects/research_projects.html. 
Marigold Technologies. (2007). "Central Office Lookup Tools."   Retrieved October, 13, 
2007, from http://www.marigoldtech.com/lists/co.php. 
McGuire, R. K. (1995). "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis and Design Earthquakes: 
Closing the Loop." Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 85(5): 1275-
1284. 
McGuire, R. K. (2001). "Deterministic V.S. Probabilistic Earthquake Hazards and 
Risks." Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 21: 377-384. 
Melchers, R. E. (1999). Structural Reliability Analysis and Prediction. London, John 
Willey & Sons. 
Meliopoulos, A. P. S. (2005). Power System Modeling, Analysis, and Control. Atlanta, 
Georgia. 
Meliopoulos, A. P. S., G. J. Cokkinides, F. Galvan, and B. Fardanesh (2006). Gps-
Synchronized Data Acquisition: Technology Assessment and Research Issues. 
39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS'06, 
January 4, 2006 - January 7, 2006, Kauai, HI, United states, Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers Computer Society. 
Min, P. S. H., Manjunath (1990). "End-to-End Planing Model for Optimal Evolution of 
Telecommunication Network." 200-206. 
Mohagheghi, S., R. H. Alaileh, G. Cokkinides, and A. P. Sakis Meliopoulos (2007). 
Distributed State Estimation Based on the Supercalibrator Concept - Laboratory 
Implementation. 2007 iREP Symposium- Bulk Power System Dynamics and 
Control - VII, Revitalizing Operational Reliability, August 19, 2007 - August 24, 
2007, Charleston, SC, United states, Inst. of Elec. and Elec. Eng. Computer 
Society. 
 158 
Monticelli, A., and F. F. Wu (1985a). "Network Observability: Identification of 
Observable Islands and Measurement Placement." IEEE transactions on power 
apparatus and systems PAS-104(5): 1035-1041. 
Monticelli, A., and F. F. Wu (1985b). "Network Observability: Theory." IEEE 
transactions on power apparatus and systems PAS-104(5): 1042-1048. 
Mori, H., and S. Tsuzuki (1991). "A Fast Method for Topological Observability Analysis 
Using a Minimum Spanning Tree Technique." IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems 6(2): 491-500. 
National Science Foundation. (1997). "Nsf Funds Earthquake Research Centers in 
Calfornia, Illinois and New York."   Retrieved June 1, 2008, from 
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=102833. 
Newman, D. E. N., Bertrand; Dobson, I.; Lynch, V. E.; Gradney, Paul (2005). Risk 
Assessment in Complex Interacting Infrastructure Systems. 38th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences. 
Nojima, N., and H. Kameda (1991). Cross-Impact Analysis for Lifeline Interactions. The 
Third United States Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Los 
Angeles, CA, USA, Publ by ASCE, New York, NY, USA. 
Noll, A. M. (1998). Introduction to Telephones and Telephone Systems. Los Angeles, 
California, Artech House. 
O'Reilly, G., A. Jrad, R. Nagarajan, T. Brown, and S. Conrad (2007). Critical 
Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters. Networks 2006: 12th 
International Telecommunications Network Strategy and Planning Symposium, 
November 6, 2006 - November 9, 2006, New Delhi, India, Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers Inc. 
O'Reilly, G., B. Uzunalioglu, S. Conrad, and W. Beyeler (2005). Inter-Infrastructure 
Simulations across Telecom, Power, and Emergency Services. 5th International 
Workshop on Design of Reliable Communication Networks 2005, October 16, 
2005 - October 19, 2005, Island of Ischia, Naples, Italy, Inst. of Elec. and Elec. 
Eng. Computer Society. 
O'Reilly, G. P., D. J. Houck, E. Kim, T. B. Morawski, D. D. Picklesimer, and H. 
Uzunalioglu (2004). Infrastructure Simulations of Disaster Scenarios. Networks 
 159 
2004 - 11th International Telecommunications Network Startegy and Planning 
Symposium, June 13, 2004 - June 16, 2004, Vienna, Austria, VDE Verlag GmbH. 
Obal, W. D. I. S., William H. (1993). "A Model-Based Foundation for Evaluation Large 
Scale Telecommunication Systems." 
Population Division, U. S. C. B. (2009). "Geographic Comparison Table, Tennessee by 





Power Systems Engineering Research Center (2005). Comprehensive Power System 
Reliability Assessment. A. P. Meliopoulos. 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1998). Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 (Pdd-63) on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The White 
House. Washington D. C. 
Rinaldi, S. M. (2004). Modeling and Simulating Critical Infrastructures and Their 
Interdependencies, Big Island, HI., United States, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Computer Society, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331, United 
States. 
Rinaldi, S. M., J. P. Peerenboom, and T. K. Kelly (2001). "Identifying, Understanding, 
and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies." IEEE Control Systems 
Magazine 21(6): 11-25. 
Rosato, V., L. Issacharoff, F. Tiriticco, S. Meloni, S. De Porcellinis, and R. Setola 
(2008). "Modelling Interdependent Infrastructures Using Interacting Dynamical 
Models." International Journal of Critical Infrastructures 4(Compendex): 63-79. 
Schiff, A. J. (1995). Northridge Earthquake Lifeline Performance and Post-Earthquake 
Response. Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, ASCE: 1-329. 
Schiff, A. J. (1997). Post-Earthquake Investigation  of Lifelines. Reston, VA, ASCE. 
 160 
Schiff, A. J. (1999). "Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake of January 17, 1995 - Lifeline 
Performance." Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering 
Monograph(14): 1-332. 
Schiff, A. J. (2004). "Documenting Damage, Disruption, Interdependencies and the 
Emergency Response of Power and Communication Systems after Earthquakes." 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructures 1(1): 100-107. 
Schiff, A. J., and A. Tang (2000). Chi-Chi, Taiwan, Earthquake of September 21, 1999 : 
Lifeline Performance Reston, VA, American Society of Civil Engineers. 
Shimomura, T., and T. Takada (2004). Estimation for Seismic Ground Motion Using 
Macro-Spatial Correlation Model. 3rd Asian-Pacific Symposium on Structural 
Reliability and Its Applications  
Shinozuka, M., A. Rose, and R. T. Eguchi (1998). Engineering and Socioeconomic 
Impact of Earthquake - an Analysis of Electricity Lifeline Disruptions in the New 
Madrid Area. Buffalo, NY, Multidiciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research Center. 
Snow, A. P., G. R. Weckman, and K. Chayanam (2006). "Modeling Telecommunication 
Outages Due to Power Loss." International Journal of Industrial Engineering : 
Theory Applications and Practice 13(Compendex): 51-60. 
Song, J., and S.-Y. Ok (2009). "Multi-Scale System Reliability Analysis of Lifeline 
Networks under Earthquake Hazards." Earthquake Engineering & Structural 
Dynamics: n/a-n/a. 
Stefopoulos, G. K., R. H. Alaileh, G. J. Cokkinides, and A. P. Sakis Meliopoulos (2007). 
On Three-Phase State Estimation in the Presence of Gps-Synchronized Phasor 
Measurements. 2007 39th North American Power Symposium, NAPS, September 
30, 2007 - October 2, 2007, Las Cruces, NM, United states, Inst. of Elec. and 
Elec. Eng. Computer Society. 
Takada, T., and T. Shimomura (2004). Macro-Spatial Correlation Structural of Seismic 
Gound Motion of the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake. 9th ASCE Specialty Conference 
on Probabilistic Mechanics and Structural Reliability. 
Tang, A. K. (1998). Factors Affecting Congestion (Change of Traffic Pattern) of 
Telecommunication Systems and Networks. The Workshop on Performance 
 161 
Criteria for Telecommunication Services Under Earthquake Conditions, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California. 
Tang, A. K., and A. J. Schiff (1996). Method of Achieving Improved Seismic 
Performance of Communications Systems. New York, NY, ASCE. 
Tao, Y., and A. P. S. Meliopoulos (2011). Optimal Power Flow Via Quadratic Power 
Flow. 2011 IEEE/PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE 2011, 
March 20, 2011 - March 23, 2011, Phoenix, AZ, United states, IEEE Computer 
Society. 
Taylor, C. E. (2002). Acceptable Risk Processes : Lifelines and Natural Hazards. Reston, 
VA, American Society of Civil Engineers. 
The Associated Press. (2009). "2.8 Earthquake in Memphis, Tn."   Retrieved December 
12, 2009, from www.volunteertv.com/news/headlines/37746299. 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). "2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year 






USEIA. (2009). "Electricity Net Generation:  Electric Power Sector, 1949-2009."   
Retrieved July 28, 2011, from 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/txt/ptb0802b.html. 
USGS. (2009, August 31, 2009 ). "2009 Psha Interactive Deagregation."   Retrieved July 




Wang, M., and T. Takada (2005). "Macrospatial Correlation Model of Seismic Ground 
Motions." Earthquake Spectra 21(4): 1137-1156. 
 162 
Werner, S. D., D. K. Ostrom, and C. E. Taylor (2002). Planning of Unified Lifeline 
Risk/Reliability Platform for Seismic Risk Decision Making. Richmond, 
California, Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER): 48. 
Wong, F. (1998). Concentration, System Modeling, and Telecommunications 
Performance. The Workshop on Performance Criteria for Telecommunication 
Services Under Earthquake Conditions, Stanford University, Stanford, California. 
Yang, F., A. P. S. Meliopoulos, G. J. Cokkinides, and G. Stefopoulos (2007). "A Bulk 
Power System Reliability Assessment Methodology." European Transactions on 
Electrical Power 17(4): 413-425. 
Yang, F., A. P. S. Meliopoulos, G. J. Cokkinides, and G. K. Stefopoulos (2006). 
Contingency Simulation Using Single Phase Quadratized Power Flow. 2006 9th 
International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, 
PMAPS, June 11, 2006 - June 15, 2006, Stockholm, Sweden, Inst. of Elec. and 
Elec. Eng. Computer Society. 
Yao, B.-H., L.-L. Xie, and E.-J. Huo (2004). "Comprehensive Study Method for Lifeline 
System Interaction under Seismic Conditions." Acta Seismologica Sinica English 







Kanoknart Leelardcharoen was born in Chiang Mai, Thailand in 1980. He 
graduated Bachelor of Engineering in Civil Engineering from Chulalongkorn University 
in Bangkok, Thailand in 2002. Soon after graduating, he joined an international company 
as a civil/structural engineer involved in the design of a nuclear power plant in a high 
seismic zone. After practicing engineering for two years, he came to Georgia Institute of 
Technology in pursuing his graduate studies. Kanoknart enrolled as a master student in 
the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering in the fall of 2004. During his master 
program, he joined a group of graduate students who conducted research in earthquake 
engineering for the Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAEC). His research focused on 
seismic performance assessment of interdependent infrastructure systems. In 2005, He 
earned his Master’s degree and decided to continue his graduate studies and research 
work with the institute. He started his doctoral program in the spring of 2006. His current 
research is focusing on interdependencies between critical infrastructures and 
telecommunication systems. 
